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SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE INF
NEGOTIATIONS
AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

Howard J. Baumgardner

December 1987

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Soviet Objectives In The INF Negotiations
and
European Security

by

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ABSTRACT

On 12 December 1979, NATO officials announced the decision to deploy 108 Pershing II nuclear missiles and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles. The NATO decision was met by a determined Soviet effort to prevent the deployment of the new missiles. The Soviet effort consisted of negotiations, diplomatic propaganda, and covert measures. When it was clear that the deployment was not going to be stopped, the Soviets agreed to formal INF arms reduction talks. It is this author's opinion that the Soviet negotiation tactics, during the INF talks, supported the long range goal of reducing the military effectiveness of NATO, and also supported the goal of reducing U.S. influence in Europe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES

On September 18, 1987 President Reagan announced that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement in principle on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The specific details of the agreement were not announced, nor were any verification procedures. However, it appears that a formal INF agreement will be forthcoming.

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the political and military factors which have motivated the Soviet Union to pursue an INF arms control treaty with the United States. While the arms control process between the United States and the Soviet Union has been ongoing for decades. This thesis focuses on the issue of intermediate-range missiles during the period from 1979 to 1987. This thesis will explore the hypothesis that Soviet agreement to an INF treaty is not a effort to reduce tensions and the likelihood of war in Europe, but is a calculated part of its strategy to decouple the United States from NATO, and to weaken the military capability of the Atlantic alliance.

Modern arms control concepts emerged during the late 1950s with the development of the ICBM and the increase of concern about surprise attack. American theorists assumed that each side held a common interest in stable nuclear arms relationships that would reduce the risks of war by surprise or accident. Americans believed that arms control would help ease the threat of surprise attack or preemptive attack by promoting more survivable deterrent forces on both sides. Arms control further would reduce the likelihood of war by reducing incentives for an arms race. Arms control was conceived as a process that could increase stability in the world.

This concept of arms control was based on the notion that there would be areas of overriding mutual interest in improving the survivability of nuclear arsenals and reducing the risks of war. This, in fact, remained the central article of faith in arms control. There would be arms cooperation between the superpowers despite their political differences. Arms control itself would be apolitical. [Ref. 1: p.5]

Despite wide differences as to the objectives and potential contributions of arms control, it has become a part of both the United States and the Soviet Union's security policy. Support for arms control is not universal and the objectives of arms control differ between the United states and the Soviet Union.

The basic American assumptions about arms control are: it would enhance security through cooperation, it is based on common security needs, and it is based on common interests concerning world stability. Arms control would reduce the threat of war, reduce the cost of preparing for war, and reduce damage in the event of war.

The Soviet theory of stability is not the same as that of the United States. The Soviet goal in arms control has been to achieve a better correlation of forces for the Soviet Union, not to achieve stability or parity with the United States.

Generally, the U.S.S.R.'s arms control policy has been to avoid limitations that restrict its arms plans and programs. [Ref. 1: p.11]

Politics can not be divorced from arms control. Soviet political and military objectives have historically been served by the Soviet arms control policies. This thesis explores the idea that the goal of the Soviet arms control effort in the INF negotiations and in the political campaign against NATO nuclear force modernization has been to support Soviet political-military doctrine and strategy vis a vis the NATO alliance. Soviet correlation of forces versus NATO was threatened by NATO's decision to modernize its theater nuclear forces. This decision became known as the "double track decision".

B. NATO'S DOUBLE TRACK DECISION

On 12 December 1979, after considerable research and debate, NATO promulgated its "double track decision": to deploy U.S. Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, in selected West European countries if the United States were unable to negotiate the elimination of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles prior to the end of 1983. The decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe was rooted in concerns over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees and the desire to minimize the risk of war or intimidation. Shifts in the military balance and changing perceptions of the Soviet threat contributed to worries within the alliance.

Shifts in the military balance resulted primarily from the general and continuing modernization of Soviet forces, which led to increases in and improvements of LRINF

weapons. The modernization of Soviet air defenses, the deployment of the SS- 20, and perceived parity of strategic forces,¹ caused great concern within the alliance.

In regards to strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union had by 1972 acquired strategic parity with the United States, an event acknowledged by the SALT agreement. Moreover, subsequent increases in the number and accuracy of Soviet reentry vehicles began to put at risk essential components of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, especially the ICBMs on which the U.S. relied for prompt, controlled and limited counterforce strikes at Soviet targets, should this prove necessary.

In theater nuclear forces, the Soviets not only modernized short range ballistic missiles such as the Scud and Scaleboard, but also developed nuclear capable artillery and improved the range and carrying capacity of tactical aircraft. The most significant improvements, in NATO's eyes, were the production of a new medium bomber, the Backfire, and a new mobile intermediate range ballistic missile, the SS-20, with three independently targetable reentry vehicles which were more accurate than those of its predecessors. The Soviets argued that this new missile was simply a replacement for the outmoded SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. However, as there was little indication that the Soviets were phasing out the old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the suspicions of members of the Western alliance were aroused. [Ref. 2: pp.38-39]

The add ons, in 1979, were not significant enough in total numbers of nuclear weapons to alter substantially the nuclear military balance (see Appendix A). However, the mobility of the SS-20 made it more difficult to locate and destroy, while its highly accurate and lower yield nuclear warheads made it more suitable for counterforce strikes against NATO military targets. Therefore NATO's longer range theater nuclear forces became more vulnerable to Soviet strikes. All in all, the combination of larger and better Soviet forces and increasingly vulnerable NATO forces could mean that the Soviet Union would have escalation dominance, the ability to control the level of a nuclear exchange by deterring NATO from using its tactical nuclear forces, thereby rendering the "seamless web of deterrence" [Ref. 2: p.31]. The Soviets maintained that they were just seeking to maintain the theater nuclear balance not trying to upset it in their favor.

SALT neutralized U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities at the strategic level. Europeans were concerned that since the U.S. no longer had a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union, the U.S. would be less likely to honor its commitment to

¹Parity is the condition in which two nation's nuclear forces are roughly equivalent in effectiveness and capabilities.

launch nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. Moreover, the SALT balance magnified the significance of disparities between East and West in tactical nuclear weapons as well as in conventional force levels. The U.S. failure to achieve substantial limits on the Backfire bomber (during SALT II negotiations) and especially the easy U.S. acceptance of the Soviet claim that the Backfire did not have a strategic mission but only a theater role, disturbed members of NATO. This along with the failure to limit deployments of the SS-20, and the Carter administration's "neutron bomb" fiasco, led many NATO officials to believe that the U.S. was only looking after its own interests, rather than the interests of the alliance.

In May 1977 NATO officials decided to review NATO'S nuclear forces. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group delegated the review responsibility to the High Level Group consisting of officials from eleven NATO countries, with U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert as the chairman. The High Level Group was charged with examining the role of theater nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, the implications of recent Soviet theater nuclear force deployments, the need for NATO theater force modernization, and the technical, military, and political implications of alternative force postures. [Ref. 2: p.16]

By February 1978 there existed within the High Level Group a broad consensus that a new NATO nuclear weapons deployment was needed, and at a meeting in April 1979, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group decided to deploy between 200 and 600 weapons. The High Level Group was given the task to determine the final details as to numbers, types, and deployment areas. Four alternatives were contemplated: 1) Pershing II Missiles, 2) Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, 3) Sea Launched Cruise Missiles, and 4) a new mobile medium range missile. The High Level Group proposed the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. The new medium range mobile missile was dropped from consideration because it had not yet been developed, in contrast to the availability of the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile. GLCMs were chosen over SLCMs because the GLCMs would be more visible than the SLCMs thereby visibly coupling the U.S. nuclear force to Europe. Although SLCMs had the military advantage of flexible deployment, and high survivability, the political consideration for GLCMs won out. [Ref. 2: p.17]

The High Level Group also proposed, at West Germany's insistence, that at least one other continental European country would base the new forces on its soil, so that it would not appear that West Germany was the only non-nuclear country demanding

and receiving the new nuclear weapons. Moreover, the weapons would remain under U.S. control. With the weapons remaining under U.S. control, the NATO governments would not have to purchase the weapons; and it also assured the Soviet Union that the Federal Republic of Germany was not in control of nuclear weapons that could strike Soviet territory. [Ref. 2: p.18]

The High Level Group decided on the number of 572 weapons for both military and political reasons. The military wanted sufficient weapons to survive a preemptive attack, as well as the ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. The political reasoning for 572 was to have enough weapons for adequate dispersal throughout several countries, a force large enough to be a deterrent, and a force large enough to absorb force reductions from arms control negotiations. It was felt that land based systems would best demonstrate to the Soviet Union as well as the people of Western Europe, the American nuclear commitment to Western Europe in the most tangible manner. [Ref. 2: p.19]

Final deployment distribution of the new forces was 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 GLCMs in West Germany, 160 GLCMs in Great Britain, 112 GLCMs in Italy, and 48 GLCMs in Belgium and Holland respectively. [Ref. 3: p.13]

C. THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

In the 1950's the Soviet Union gave priority to the deployment of medium range systems that could strike targets around the Soviet periphery, particularly in and around Europe. This decision appears to have been conditioned by three main considerations. The first was technological. Their intercontinental bombers suffered from serious deficiencies: the Bison did not have enough range for two-way intercontinental missions, while the Bear had a lower speed and ceiling, making it more vulnerable to air defenses. With no bases close to the United States, the MRBM was the weapon of choice as it did not require inflight refueling and could not be brought down by air defenses. [Ref. 4: p.5]

The second consideration was that many of the American nuclear forces that could threaten the Soviet Union were based close to Soviet borders, in and around Europe. These bases could also be replenished with other forces in the event of war. The most important targets for the Soviets in war were those time urgent nuclear forces in Europe which the Soviets considered strategic forces since they could strike Soviet territory.

The third consideration was that the threat of nuclear destruction of Western Europe would act as a deterrent against an attack by the U.S. on the Soviet Union. The aim of deterring an American attack by threatening Western Europe with destruction complemented rather than contradicted the interest in preparing to wage a nuclear war. Soviet military thought did not then, and does not now, draw a sharp distinction between weapons for deterrence and weapons for war fighting. Deterrence for the Soviets is achieved by maintaining military forces that would enable them to fight and win a war, not just to deter a war. The deterring effect of weapons is not seen as something separate from their utility in fighting a war. These medium range systems were designed to destroy NATO military targets in the event of war.

Soviet deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces ceased in the mid-1960s and did not begin again until the mid- 1970s. Several things had changed since their initial deployment. The SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were vulnerable to a first strike attack as most were not housed in underground silos. Although Soviet doctrine gave significant importance to striking first in the event of war, the Soviets also began to become concerned about the survivability of their forces to a U.S. preemptive strike.

The operational characteristics of the SS-4 and SS-5 did not mesh well with the growing changes in Soviet doctrine. The Soviets were beginning to believe that conventional war in Europe could precede a nuclear exchange. The slow launch preparation time of the SS-4 and SS-5 was a serious problem, given their penchant for preemption. Also if conventional warfare did develop, the war could go nuclear at any time, especially with NATO's declaratory policy of first use, so flexible weapons were needed that could be fired quickly. These problems led to the production of the Backfire bomber which entered service in 1974, and the SS-20 IRBM which became operational in 1977. [Ref. 5: pp.99-105]

The SS-20 was a significant improvement over the SS-4 and SS-5. It is a solid fuel mobile missile, derived from the SS-16 ICBM. The SS-20 has three MIRV warheads and is more accurate than the SS-4 and SS-5, and takes only minutes to make ready for launching. The SS-20 also has a greater range than either the SS-4 or SS-5. [Ref. 6: p.45] The deployment of the SS-20 played an important role in the NATO "double track decision" of 12 December 1979. The European view was that the SS-20 upgraded the Soviet capabilities and moreover was a clear indication of the Soviet desire for military superiority. The Soviets have vociferously denied that their goal is military superiority and have asserted that the SS- 20 deployment was only a modernization of obsolete forces that did not alter the balance of forces. [Ref. 7: p.42]

D. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

The American support of the 1979 'double track decision' was based on the need to respond to European political concerns about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, especially after the neutron bomb affair. Supporting this decision by modernizing forces would have the important military purpose of increasing the potential costs to the Soviet Union of aggression in Europe by putting at risk targets in the Soviet Union and introducing more flexibility and survivability in NATO's force posture. Ronald Reagan voiced his support of the "double track decision" during his speech to the National Press Club on 23 November 1981:

To counter this (SS-20) the allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision, to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional, shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States. Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link can not be broken. [Ref. 8: p.187]

Reagan's "zero option" proposal in regards to the INF situation is his method of carrying out the negotiation part of the NATO "double track decision". The recent negative comments from NATO officials concerning the "zero option" proposal may indicate that many NATO Europeans do not really want an INF arms control agreement.² Many critics claim that the 'zero option' proposal does not support or follow along with the NATO position of 12 December 1979. However, Lord Peter Carrington, NATO Secretary General, supports Reagan's view:

The Zero-Option on medium-range missiles was something which was implicitly accepted by the Europeans when they agreed to the double-track decision, because the double track decision said if the Soviet Union withdraws their SS-20's, we will not deploy the cruise and Pershing missiles. [Ref. 9: p.14]

²For example: Helmut Kohl expressed his concern about the arms reductions discussed at Reykjavik:

...if all nuclear arms are cut the NATO military strategy of flexible response would be put at risk....Conventional stability in Europe must be given greater attention in the future, especially if there are drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. *Insight*, 8 December 1986, p.16

Americans and Europeans also differ in their respective views of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the doctrine of flexible response. The NATO flexible response doctrine was developed in 1967. Its declaratory policy is that any Soviet and or Warsaw pact attack will be met by adequate means. and if conventional defense did not suffice, nuclear weapons would be employed.

The strategy set out in MC 14.3 seeks to deter aggression by the maintenance of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces that would enable the Alliance to respond to any attack at any appropriate level. The initial response would be direct defense, seeking to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy has chosen to fight. If the aggression could not be contained, the Alliance would be prepared to conduct a deliberate escalation, raising but where possible controlling the scope and intensity of combat, with the aim of making the cost and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat of nuclear war more imminent. [Ref. 10: p.9]

An application of the flexible response strategy could entail the use of tactical nuclear weapons on Allied territory in an attempt to end the conflict by convincing the Soviets of the will of the Allies to resist. Many European officials and experts would prefer to use Pershing II and GLCMs, which have sufficient range to reach Soviet territory, instead of tactical nuclear weapons, to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe. The Americans, meanwhile, would prefer to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a land battle from escalating into an all-out strategic exchange. [Ref. 10: p.10]

The Europeans are more concerned with ensuring the deterrent effect of the nuclear weapons than with their war fighting capability. In their view, Pershing IIs and GLCMs offer more deterrent than tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, due to their ability to hold Soviet territory at risk. An INF agreement that would call for the removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles would lessen the deterrent to a Soviet attack. General Wolfgang Altenburg, chairman of NATO's military committee expressed the following view of nuclear deterrence:

...all of us agree that the threat of MAD (mutual assured destruction), is an abysmal way to implement our peacetime strategy of deterrence. Nonetheless, for the time being it works, and we would be prudent not to tamper with it until something better comes along....Nuclear weapons are in fact useful only as a deterrent. [Ref. 11: p.9]

The existence of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe raises the risk, for the Soviet Union, that a conventional regional conflict might escalate into a major nuclear war. These nuclear forces reduce the risk, for the United States, that an overwhelming conventional attack by the East against Western Europe would leave no other choice than that of acceptance of a fait accompli or nuclear strategic retaliation against the Soviet Union. These forward based systems may allow the U.S. to confine the war to the European continent, by exercising limited nuclear options with these forces while holding U.S. based strategic forces in reserve. The Soviets have attempted to counter the limited nuclear option policy by declaring that any nuclear attack against Soviet territory launched from Europe, would be treated just as if the weapons were launched from the U.S., and the Soviet Union would respond with nuclear attacks against U.S. territory.

If the United States were to agree in a treaty to nuclear inferiority (many believe this happened with SALT), this could raise serious questions in the minds of Soviet leaders as well as many Europeans about the American commitment to provide U.S. nuclear forces in both SALT negotiations, and have also nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe. The political imperative for the U.S. is to ensure equal ceilings in any arms control agreement. This has been the declared policy of the Reagan administration, reductions to equal ceilings, and has resulted in criticism that his approach has been too staunch, thereby preventing any arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union attempted to include forward based U.S. nuclear forces in both SALT negotiations, and have also wanted to include British and French forces in both START and INF negotiations.

These forward-based systems were indispensable elements of the security of America's allies and it was a bad omen for the talks that this matter had been raised. But there FBS was and there it remained through hundreds of hours of argumentation. [Ref. 12: p.91]

The American position has been that forward based systems are not strategic weapons but are only for use in theater operations. All U.S. administrations have rejected the Soviet proposal of including British and French nuclear systems in any negotiations.

The U.S. position is that the British and French forces are third country forces and are not, therefore, germane to U.S. - Soviet negotiations. The forces are the strategic deterrent for protection of the British and French homelands. They are independent and are not under U.S. control, and do not provide any other countries a deterrent against the Soviet threat.

The Reagan administration continues to seek an INF agreement narrowly focused on land based missiles, refusing to include nuclear capable aircraft in any missile deal, arguing that limits on aircraft could undermine the effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces.

E. SUMMARY

Soviet theater force modernization in the 1970s resulted in NATO's decision to respond with new INF missiles, if the Soviets did not remove the SS-20 missiles. The Soviets maintained that the deployment of the SS-20 did not alter the military balance in their favor.

Chapter Two discusses Soviet military and political strategy versus NATO and the relationship of the SS-20 missile to Soviet military doctrine.

II. SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARDS EUROPE

A. SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE

Western Europe has been regarded by the Soviet Union as the most important region in the global competition between socialism and capitalism. It is viewed as a potential prize due to its highly developed economic infrastructure and vast industrial base. Despite some friction, the European Economic Community has grown into a world economic power.

In 1980 the European Community's share of the world's gross national product stood at 22.6% against 22.1% for the United States and 11.5% for the Soviet Union, and the combined population of its member states equaled that of the U.S.S.R. and surpassed that of the U.S. [Ref. 13: p.28]

The successes of the EEC and Western Europe as a whole have repercussions in the various countries of Eastern Europe, and therefore pose problems for the Soviet Union's control of its satellites. Beyond Western Europe's economic and cultural success, it is the military bridgehead of the United States on the European continent. If the Soviets were able to deny the U.S. access to this bridgehead, the global power position of the U.S. would be decisively weakened. It has been the objective of the Soviet Union since 1949 to decouple the U.S. from Western Europe and to destroy NATO:

A clear, steady, and pervasive objective of Soviet policy ever since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance has been to split the political foundations of Alliance solidarity and dampen the defense efforts of the individual members. [Ref. 14: p.9]

The Soviet Union has sought to retain control of Eastern Europe, while increasing its influence in Western Europe. It has attempted to conduct a bilateral dialogue with the United States and rival ones with the West European states, particularly France and West Germany. Moscow has combined growing military power with an arms control dialogue and economic cooperation conducted under the guise of detente.

The Soviet force build-up became obvious in the late 1960s. First, it was clear that the Soviets had decided to go global militarily by building up the Soviet navy, and

other conventional forces, as well as the Warsaw pact forces. Second, the Soviets decided after the failure of the halfhearted attempts at domestic economic reform in 1965, to assign foreign trade and technological inputs from the West a more central role in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. These decisions were implemented through cooperation with the West and making detente irreversible, and helping the "world revolutionary process" along. [Ref. 15: p.40]

That is, it has endeavored to detach Western Europe from the United States and align it with the Soviet bloc, at least to the degree of rendering its ties with the United States more precarious and marginal and its ties with the Soviet Union more central and irreversible. [Ref. 15: p.47]

The Soviet Union has downplayed its massive build-up of military forces as necessary to ensure the defense of the U.S.S.R.. The Soviet Union's position has been that its military forces are for defensive purposes and have no offensive role, while the military forces of the Western powers are offensive weapons poised to be used in an invasion of the Soviet Union. However, Soviet actions and reactions must always be seen as both offensive and defensive:

Like the Soviet tradition itself (whether through its Russian or Marxist side), they blur the distinction between offensive and defensive, by involving a search for security which is by its very nature expansionist, a feeling of weakness which by its very nature leads to a demonstration of strength, a stress on maintaining the control of the empire which by its very nature encourages an attempt to establish preventive control over the external environment. [Ref. 15: p.39]

The Soviet Union has attempted to develop a policy of "peaceful coexistence"³ with the West:

³"peaceful coexistence" is the absence of war but not relaxation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism.

To realise the policy of P.C., it is very important to enhance mutually beneficial economic, scientific and cultural ties between states with different social systems in every possible way. The benefit gained by individual capitalist countries from such ties cannot, of course, prevent or noticeably slow down the general decay of the capitalist system resulting from the aggravation of inherent contradictions. As the principle of P.C. wins growing recognition and the contacts between the two social systems are enhanced, the role and importance of ideological struggle as an indispensable component of the world revolutionary process increases. *A Dictionary of Scientific Communism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p.172.

Soviet peacetime policy clearly reflects an anticoalition strategy toward Western Europe. The Soviets have sought to play on trends toward greater consideration for national, rather than joint strategies among Western powers. [Ref. 16: p.210]

The maximization of Soviet power requires the reduction of NATO's cohesion and the pursuit by the Soviets of a strategy to drive wedges and expand fissures within the alliance.

The preferred Soviet method of achieving such goals has been detente in conditions of clear Soviet superiority. Without detente, Soviet superiority or military pressure can encourage Atlantic unity or, if the West Europeans perceive the Atlantic connection as unreliable or dangerous, drive the West Europeans toward unity and an autonomous defense. Without Soviet superiority detente, can promote instability in Eastern Europe by raising East European expectations excessively and by increasing West European influence in the area. It is only the two together which maximize Soviet interests. [Ref. 15: p.47]

A major plank of Soviet detente policy has been arms control. Soviet arms control policy combined with the spirit of detente attempts to lessen West European fears of Soviet military capabilities. By participating in arms control discussions, the Soviets create an image as a nation which wants to lessen the chance of war and one that is working toward world stability. What is important for the Soviets is the appearance of negotiating, not necessarily reaching an agreement or treaty. The Soviets will, however, definitely sign an agreement which codifies their numerical superiority (such as SALT I limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs) or which creates a favorable balance of forces for the Soviet Union. Arms control, coupled with detente, is part of the grand design of Soviet political expansionism. The Soviets probably regard the INF negotiations as an instrument against NATO, an enterprise which may result in creating military superiority for the Soviet Union.

B. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE TOWARDS NATO

Military doctrine and military strategy are often considered as being one and the same in the United States. However, the Soviets make a distinction between doctrine and strategy. Military doctrine defines the nature of a future war, the probable adversaries, Soviet objectives in such a war, general characteristics of the forces required to achieve the objectives, and the policies for preparedness. Military doctrine is developed by the Soviet politburo, and once it has been formulated it is not debatable. [Ref. 17: pp.88-89]

Military strategy is subordinate to military doctrine. Military strategy specifies how the objectives developed by doctrine are to be achieved, what forces and weapons are required, and the interrelationships between military requirements and economic and technological capabilities. Military strategy can be and is often debated in the Soviet Union. Military doctrine requires the Soviet Union to be prepared to fight and win a war at all levels of combat, including nuclear war. [Ref. 17: p.79]

Soviet military doctrine and military strategy stems from Lenin and was first practiced during the Civil War. Lenin's strategy of maneuver consisted of: finding the weakest link, massing forces until the correlation of forces had become favorable, then breaking through, encircling and annihilating the enemy. This strategy was used repeatedly by the ground forces during the Great patriotic War. The backbone of this doctrine was a unified command controlling combined arms forces, which is still in vogue today.

An essential question for a military planner today is whether future wars are likely to be conventional, nuclear, or a combination of both. This question has been debated by both Soviet and Western policy makers since the creation of atomic weapons. At the crux of the debate is the problem of defining the military utility of nuclear weapons. Soviet doctrine has evolved since the revolution in military affairs occurred in 1953.

From 1953 to 1964. Soviet doctrine held that if war occurred it would be an all out intercontinental nuclear war. The war would entail massive use of nuclear weapons from the start of the conflict. The 1962 edition of *Soviet Military Strategy* said:

The use of strategic missiles will have an especially great effect on the nature of war as a whole. Their quantitative and qualitative development in the Soviet Union has achieved such a level that it is now possible to destroy simultaneously the necessary number of objectives of an aggressor in the most remote regions of the earth and to put entire countries out of the war as a result of massed missile attacks. [Ref. 18: p.194]

This doctrine was declaratory (vice operational), and it was enunciated so completely that it helped create the so-called myth of the "missile gap" in the late 1950's. This doctrine emphasized the importance of the Strategic Rocket Forces, formed by Khrushchev in 1959, and reduced the importance of conventional forces especially the Ground Forces. The second edition of *Soviet Military Strategy* (1963) said:

Thus, rockets are the most effective and most promising means of armed combat. The massive use of nuclear rockets substantially alters the nature of war and the methods of waging it and imparts to war an extremely decisive and destructive character. [Ref. 18: p.194]

The dismissal of Khrushchev led to a review and reappraisal of military doctrine. The possibility of war starting with a conventional phase emerged along with the possibility of a theater war being fought only along conventional lines. The U.S. shift from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" increased the likelihood of conventional warfare, and resulted in a reevaluation of Soviet doctrine.

Coming to grips with the military implications of Secretary of Defense McNamara's concept of 'flexible response', a significant initial phase of conventional warfare was recognized as possibly preceding the first nuclear exchanges in theatre. The enemy might well initiate conflict at the conventional level and, all else being equal, it could be to Soviet advantage not to resort immediately to nuclear warfare. [Ref. 19: p.22]

In 1967 U.S. forces reached the level planned by McNamara: 1,000 Minutemen ICBMs, 54 Titan ICBMs, 41 SSBNs, and 500 B-52 bombers. This publicly announced force structure established a benchmark of parity for Soviet strategic nuclear weapon procurements. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was reaching parity with U.S. nuclear forces. Parity decreased the likelihood of the United States initiating a nuclear exchange, thereby creating a situation of mutual deterrence.

Soviet military theoreticians had apparently concluded that as a result of the changing conditions brought about primarily by the Soviet achievement of strategic parity, the exercise of restraint in the employment of nuclear weapons by both sides was a distinct possibility. [Ref. 20: pp. 59-60]

In a 1968 *Military Thought* article, Marshall Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko discussed the problems of planning for modern war. The possible scenarios included conventional war, limited theater nuclear war, as well as general nuclear war.

By this time, Soviet military theoreticians had apparently concluded that in the event of a future conflict, the possibility existed that the conduct of nuclear warfare could be restricted to certain, unspecified geographic regions; these regions could be as large as a theater of military action (TMA), which represents the basic geographic unit in Soviet military planning. Moreover, limitations on the extent of nuclear weapons employment within TMAs were also acknowledged as a distinct possibility. [Ref. 20: p.59]

By the mid-1970s the Soviets believed that a central war in Europe would most likely begin as conventional, and at some point in the conflict, NATO would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons. The Soviets would preempt with operational and tactical nuclear weapons. There was nothing in the Soviet literature that suggested that NATO's use of nuclear weapons would cause a massive strategic nuclear strike by the Soviets. The Soviet preemptive strike would entail surface to surface missiles, nuclear artillery, and tactical aviation. The targets would be NATO's means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as enemy force groupings, main operating bases, and command and control centers. The Soviets would consider these strikes to be limited nuclear strikes, even though they required a large number of nuclear weapons. The strikes would be limited, in that they were limited to a specific geographic area. [Ref. 20: p.62]

The Soviets did not believe that limited nuclear war necessarily had to escalate to general nuclear war. However, if the enemy did escalate the conflict to general war, the Soviets were prepared to fight and do their best to win an all out nuclear war.

Parity in strategic nuclear forces was not the only reason why the Soviets would not want immediate nuclear use in war. Some believed that a rough parity in conventional forces would offer few incentives for either side to escalate to nuclear use. Escalation might be more probable if there was a drastic imbalance in conventional capabilities. Some believed that the destruction caused by nuclear weapons would be unpredictable and could be disruptive to the combat operations of one's own forces in the theater of military operations. Large scale theater nuclear use could have a disruptive effect on Soviet troop control.

The massive preemption case aside, Soviet military planners may have concluded that the uncertainties and complexities of operating in an unrestrained nuclear environment offset the benefits of massive employment. Considerations of purely military effectiveness would appear to underlie this conclusion. [Ref. 20: p.70]

In the end, for all their studies and analyses (or perhaps, because of them), Soviet military writers do not appear to demonstrate confidence that they know how to manage a full scale theater nuclear war. [Ref. 19: p.22]

This is not to suggest that they no longer have an interest in theater nuclear forces, only that there are significant command and control advantages in conventional vice nuclear war.

The destructive power of nuclear weapons must be considered against the political and military objectives:

An overriding desire to avoid massive damage to the Soviet homeland has motivated Soviet decision makers not only to develop concepts for this mode of warfare but also to invest in the development of a flexible, survivable, and increasingly effective in-theater nuclear capability. [Ref. 20: p.76]

If the overall Soviet objective in a war against NATO is to capture the European industrial base intact while limiting and controlling collateral damage, the use of nuclear weapons is of supreme importance. Turning Europe into a nuclear waste zone would not aid the Soviet Union in post war reconstruction.

With the U.S. acknowledgement of parity at the level of strategic nuclear forces, with the SALT I treaty, the Soviets concluded that a future war might no longer be initiated by massive strikes on the homelands or on theater targets. A clear opportunity now existed for the Soviets to postpone, and possibly altogether avoid, U.S. strikes on the Soviet homeland. In order to achieve this objective, the Soviets required a robust theater conventional and nuclear force structure while at the same time developing survivable and effective intercontinental forces to deter, and if necessary to defeat, the U.S. exercise of its strategic nuclear guarantee. By the mid-1970s, Soviet military theoreticians had successfully developed an approach to the conduct of limited nuclear warfare. The past twenty years of Soviet military development have demonstrated their commitment to foot the bill for this force procurement. [Ref. 20: p.72]

U.S. declaratory doctrine was officially modified on 4 March 1974 with the issuance of NSDM-242. Four factors influenced NSDM-242. First, there was a growing U.S. anxiety about the strategic balance. Second, there was concern over the increase in Soviet weapon programs and increases across the board in Soviet force posture. Third, technological advances in weaponry created more flexible counterforce options. Fourth, there was an increasingly unsympathetic attitude toward the "MAD" approach articulated by some officials. NSDM-242 reportedly called for changes in U.S. targeting policy and highlighted the concept of 'limited nuclear options' in theater warfare.

This change in U.S. military doctrine brought forth vociferous Soviet criticism of the possibility of limited nuclear warfare. The Soviets also were critical of the revised strategy because they felt that it was an attempt to recover U.S. losses in SALT:

The Soviets believed that these U.S. developments were designed to defeat a primary objective of the Soviet strategic buildup: that of decoupling U.S. strategic forces from NATO. [Ref. 20: p.73]

Soviet declaratory policy rejected the possibility of a limited nuclear war, and attempted to discredit the new U.S. doctrine. Despite their declaratory policy against the possibility of limiting nuclear war, the Soviets continued to build forces and conduct training in the military art of combined arms warfare in a limited nuclear war. The Soviet rejection of limited theater nuclear war became a key plank of their propaganda campaign against the deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs by NATO.⁴

C. SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS NATO

Soviet military doctrine requires military planners to develop strategy to cover all the contingencies in all conceivable types of war. Military objectives are subordinate to political objectives. The objectives in a war against NATO would be: to capture the industrial base while causing as little collateral damage as possible, to avoid an intercontinental nuclear exchange with the United States, and to avoid a two-front war. These objectives would be best obtained by fighting a conventional war. The main theater of military action would be the Western TVD. The Northern and Southern TVD's would be used only for flanking operations to support the main effort in central Europe. The Soviets would probably adopt a defensive strategy in all other TVD's.

The highest priority theater mission for the Soviet forces would be the destruction of NATO theater nuclear forces, and their means of delivery. (See Table). This would entail immediate attacks on tactical nuclear forces with conventional forces, while Soviet tactical nuclear forces would be held in reserve to act as a deterrent against enemy employment of nuclear forces. The Soviet TNF would be kept in rear areas safe from enemy conventional forces. Therefore, during the course of the conflict the nuclear balance would shift to the Soviet side.

The critical targets of NATO TNF reportedly consist of: 150 air bases, 40-50 military bases, five naval facilities, 50 nuclear storage sites, and 30 troop staging areas, for a total of 275 to 285 nuclear associated targets. [Ref. 21: p.24]

Defeating NATO without nuclear weapons would depend upon the speed and destructiveness of the initial Soviet conventional offensive. The strategy for carrying out this offensive is composed of three parts: the air operation, the air defense operation, and the ground operation. The timing of these attacks would be critical for

⁴This will be explained further in Chapter Three

the success of the military campaign. Ideally, military operations would commence prior to NATO's force mobilization and force dispersal. Strategic warning therefore plays a big role in the overall plan. It would greatly aid the conventional phase of the conflict to give as little strategic warning as possible, utilizing surprise whenever possible. Soviet military writings have stressed the importance of surprise in military operations since 1953.

In the initial phase of the war, Soviet air strikes would attack Group I and Group II targets. These targets are considered strategic by the Soviets because they have the ability and capability to attack the Soviet homeland. (see Table) Soviet Long Range Aviation would be used to strike rear areas in the theater, while Frontal Aviation would concentrate on targets in the operational tactical area.

The air operation plan would direct Frontal Aviation and the Ground Forces to open corridors through NATO ground based air defense, also under attack by artillery and rockets, to prevent NATO aircraft from moving into such corridors.

Group II targets, tactical nuclear forces, would be attacked simultaneously, if there are sufficient air assets. These targets are considered so important that Frontal Aviation's traditional mission, support of the Ground Forces, would become secondary:

In those areas where military operations will employ only conventional weapons, neutralization of enemy nuclear weapon carrying aircraft and missiles will constitute the major task, which will require a large number of aircraft. Therefore only limited air power can be assigned to support ground operations. [Ref. 22: p.26]

This suspected shortage of air assets received attention with the development of four new aircraft, all of which have theater roles. These were the MIG-27 Flogger, the SU-17 Fitter, the SU- 24 Fencer (all for Frontal Aviation), and the TU-26 Backfire. All of these new aircraft are nuclear capable, but are primarily designed for conventional warfare.

Another part of the air operation plan directs special operation assaults on NATO's nuclear, air, air defense assets, and command and control centers. Small teams of special purpose troops would be used against these Group I and Group II targets.

The air defense plan has as its primary goal the task of establishing air superiority in order to defend Soviet and Warsaw pact forces. The Soviets would attempt to gain the initiative through the combined offensive and defensive actions of Frontal Aviation, artillery, and tactical surface to surface missiles.

The mission of the Ground Forces is also to neutralize, as rapidly as possible, the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons:

Every gun capable of firing a nuclear warhead round and every missile launcher should be destroyed as soon as it is spotted. Nuclear ammunition should also be immediately destroyed as soon as it is discovered at fire positions, bases, or in transit. [Ref. 23: p.27]

The Ground Force operation requires rapid penetration of the enemy defensive zone. The key to the success of the operation is the application of military force under the concept of 'combined arms':

Combined Arms, in the Soviet use of the term, requires the continuous and detailed coordination of the combat activities of all elements of a combat force air and ground fire support and maneuver under the control of a single commander at every level of the combat organization from platoon up to theater of military operations. [Ref. 24: p.6]

The organization for this operation consists of four elements: the advanced penetration and raiding element which would consist of 30% of the force; the first echelon 66% of the force; the second echelon, 33% to 50% of the force; and some reserves. The mission of the first echelon is rapid penetration and fragmentation of NATO's forward defense. The second echelon is to enter and exploit penetrations secured by first echelon units. Penetration and raiding would be the mission of the OMG (operational maneuver group). The task of the OMGs is to penetrate NATO's lines to seize economic or political centers deep in NATO's rear area very early in the offensive to induce in NATO the perception that continued resistance would be useless. [Ref. 24: pp. 8-9]

The Soviets expect NATO to escalate to nuclear use in the theater due to NATO's inability to defeat the Soviet conventional offensive. If NATO's nuclear forces have not yet been neutralized, the Soviets would preempt in the likelihood of imminent use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. Predicting when to strike will be difficult, however first use is of secondary importance:

It is not the first nuclear use per se that is of concern to Soviet military planner so much as the first decisive use of nuclear weapons in the theatre. [Ref. 19: p.28]

Once the Soviet political leadership authorizes the release of nuclear weapons, Soviet military strategy calls for preemptive nuclear strikes against targets distributed across the entire depth of the theater. Missile strikes will be initiated by ICBMs assigned to theater targets, MRBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs from Soviet submarines against Group I and Group II targets. Tactical missiles deployed with the Ground Forces will be used to provide secondary coverage of Group I and Group II targets. Nuclear armed aircraft would be directed against mobile missile targets, mobile command and control facilities, and for targets where collateral damage is to be limited. [Ref. 21: p.29]

The SS-20 did increase the options available to Soviet planners. The current deployment of 270 SS-20 missiles can deliver 810 warheads on European targets.⁵ With only 285 critical targets, the SS-20 can cover the entire spectrum of time urgent NATO nuclear forces. If the SS-20 missiles were removed as the result of an INF treaty, the Soviets would still have ample nuclear missile forces to counter the critical NATO targets.

The Soviet SS-19 ICBM could carry out the same mission as the SS-20. Sixty SS-19 ICBM's are believed to be targeted against NATO, with six MIRV's each, these missiles could launch 360 warheads. [Ref. 21: p.26] The vacancy caused by the removal of the SS-20 could also be filled by SLBMs. The loss of the SS-20 and SS-4 missiles still leaves 1159 short range missiles as well as over 8,900 nuclear warheads for theater use. The removal of the SS-20 is really numerically insignificant in view of the total number of nuclear warheads available to the Soviets.

The military significance of the SS-20 depends on one's analytical perspective. The SS-20 does offer increased reliability, hard target kill potential, mobility, rapid reload and rapid preparation time for firing.

However, in terms of net nuclear damage on critical NATO nuclear targets, the contribution of the SS-20 is not substantial. The chronic vulnerability of the NATO forces to Soviet TNF has existed for two decades. [Ref. 21: pp. 28-29]

D. SUMMARY

Soviet military doctrine had developed strategies to cover both conventional and theater nuclear war. The 1979 decision by NATO to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear missiles complicated the Soviet preference to fight a conventional war vice nuclear war, in Europe, should a conflict become necessary. It was therefore necessary

⁵Figures are for European deployment, not counting reloads.

to neutralize these new NATO missiles. Chapter Three discusses the Soviet diplomatic effort from 1979 to 1983 to persuade NATO not to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Later chapters will discuss the 1984 to 1987 period.

Table

Target Categories for Soviet Tactical Nuclear Force Strikes

Group I: Nuclear Means of Strategic Functions

- MRBM and IRBM
- SSB and SSBN Bases
- Long range strike aircraft and bases Nuclear storage
- Nuclear Storage strikes
- Strategic Command, Control, Communication facilities

Group II: Nuclear Means of Operational and Operational-Tactical Function

- Tactical aviation and aircraft carrier aviation and bases
- Short range cruise and ballistic missiles
- Nuclear storage depots
- Command, Control, and Communications

Group III:

- Ground force formations
- Strategic and operational reserve concentrations
- Stores of non-nuclear ammunition and weapons
- Naval bases

Group IV:

- Air defense airfields
- Air defense missile complexes

Group V:

- Military industrial objectives
- Political administrative centers
- Transportation nodes

(Source: Dzhelaukov(1966), Kutakhov(1973) cited in S. M. Meyer *Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives*, Adelphi Paper No.187

III. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND COVERT EFFORTS 1979-1983

A. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1979

The Soviet Union engaged in a major propaganda campaign to prevent the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles by NATO, from late 1979 to November 1983.

Propaganda has long been a tool utilized in the implementation of Soviet foreign policy against the NATO alliance. The target audience of the propaganda in the INF issue included both the general public and the political elites of Europe. The goal was to cause a political reversal of the decision to deploy new missiles. The campaign used both covert and overt methods to sway public opinion against INF modernization by NATO.

The campaign was based on some general themes which were employed on both the covert and overt diplomatic level. These basic themes were:

1. Statements on the Military Balance
"A balance currently exists in Europe"
2. Soviet objectives and Military Doctrine
"The Soviet Union does not seek military superiority"
"The only Soviet desire is world peace"
3. United States Objectives and Motives
"The U.S. seeks military superiority"
"The U.S. is not interested in arms control"
"The U.S. seeks a first strike capability"
"The U.S. is attempting to limit a future war to Europe"
4. Military and Diplomatic Consequences
"New INF deployments will stimulate a new round in the arms race"
"It will prompt new Soviet counter deployments"
"INF host countries will become targets of Soviet missiles"
"INF deployments will increase the likelihood of a conflict"
"Will reduce future trade potential and destroy the spirit of detente"
"Will inhibit future arms control negotiations"
5. Soviet Arms Control Efforts
"Soviets seek end of the arms race"
"Soviets claim of unilateral moratorium on SS-20 missile deployments"
[Ref. 25: p.v]

Soviet propaganda concerning the nuclear and conventional balance of forces was emphasized during the campaign, especially on the diplomatic side. The diplomatic effort featured President Brezhnev, General Secretary Andropov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Ustinov, Nikolai Portugalov, and Vadim Zagladin amongst other party members. These individuals made frequent use of Western media sources to promulgate their propaganda themes. On 2 March 1979, President Brezhnev formulated his claim that military parity existed between NATO and Warsaw pact forces:

After all, it is a fact that a general military equilibrium does exist in Europe, even if there are differences in the structure of the armed forces of each side. And it is from this fact that one should proceed. [Ref. 26: p.69]

Brezhnev also attempted to place the blame on NATO and the United States for increasing tension in Europe. Meanwhile he claimed that only the Soviet Union was trying to reach agreements that would enhance peace. This address occurred nine months prior to the formal decision by NATO to deploy new INF missiles, and the Soviet diplomatic effort to forestall this eventual decision was already under way. According to Brezhnev:

To spread detente to the military sphere is today's priority task. This is particularly necessary because the NATO bloc is feverishly building up its armaments, complicating the situation in Europe. On our part, we are striving for agreement on real measures to lessen the level of military confrontation on the continent, which would strengthen the foundation of European peace. Unfortunately there are so far no changes in this respect. [Ref. 26: p.69]

B. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1980

In a lengthy article in *International Affairs*, April 1980, N. Polyanov supported several of the Soviet disinformation themes:

1. The claim that a military balance exists:

The most important of these is the new military balance forces in Europe and the world; for many years now, there has been a rough equilibrium.

2. The claim that the U.S. seeks superiority over the Soviet Union:

USA intends to use Western Europe not only to achieve continental superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries, but also to firm up the USA's position of strength on a global scale....There is every reason to believe the decision imposed by the USA on its NATO partners, is seen in the United States as a crucial component of its strategy for the 1980's, as a first step in the drive to tilt the balance of forces in its favor.

3. The claim that the Soviet Union does not seek superiority but only parity:
The truth is that the Soviet Union has not upset the equilibrium, but has only taken steps to restore it by deploying medium range missiles in the western part of the country.
4. The claim that NATO's deployment of INF missiles will increase the likelihood of a conflict:

It is clear, however, that implementation of NATO's plans would undoubtedly aggravate the situation in Europe and poison the international climate as a whole. This would be detrimental to both West European countries and the United States itself. So, as a result of the Brussels decision, they now face a serious choice: either to assume the grave responsibility for a deterioration in the world political climate, or to think better of it and stop short of the dangerous move. The only reasonable choice for Europe is to abandon the arms race and the policy of confrontation and go over to disarmament and cooperation. [Ref. 27: pp.90-95]

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that NATO took its 1979 decision prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a cause for NATO to modernize its nuclear forces, while also claiming that a balance of forces existed in Europe:

The course directed toward the arms race was also expressed in the recent NATO decision which, incidentally had been taken before events in Afghanistan and which concerns the production and deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in certain West European countries. The common aim of all these actions is clear: to break the existing approximate parity, the equality in military strength of the East and the West, or, to be more precise, of the Soviet Union and the United States, and to try and gain superiority over the socialist community. [Ref. 28: p.49]

The Soviets attempted to persuade NATO to abandon the decision to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles. This was clearly evident as Gromyko suggested that the Soviet Union would attend disarmament talks only if the deployment decision was overturned:

We reaffirm our readiness to attend appropriate talks on questions of disarmament regarding Europe if the NATO decision on U.S. medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe is repealed or at least if its implementation is officially suspended. [Ref. 28: p.50]

Gromyko was holding future arms control negotiations hostage to the abandonment of the deployment decision, thereby portraying the double track decision as an obstacle to arms reductions. However, NATO made the decision that the deployment of new

missiles might be the only way to convince the Soviets to reduce their SS-20 missile force.

In July 1980, during a visit by Helmut Schmidt to Moscow, the Soviets dropped their demand that NATO abandon its plan to deploy new INF missiles prior to any arms control negotiations. This led to preliminary U.S.-Soviet talks in October 1980 in Geneva Switzerland. The U.S.S.R.'s position, at this time, was that all American systems capable of striking Soviet territory from Europe, should be included in any arms reduction talks concerning Europe. Moreover, the Soviets asserted, the British and French nuclear forces should also be included with U.S. force totals in any arms talks.

C. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1981

In 1981, President Leonid Brezhnev announced a new tactic to forestall the NATO INF deployment. During his address to the 26th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union on 23 February, he stated:

Whether one takes strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in both cases approximate equality exists between the two sides. In some types of weapons, the West has a certain advantage. In others, we have the edge. This equality could be more enduring if relevant treaties and agreements were concluded....We propose then an agreement be reached to set a moratorium right now on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by the NATO countries and the U.S.S.R., that a quantitative and qualitative freeze be put on the existing level of these weapons - including, needless to say, the U.S. forward based weapons in this region. [Ref. 28: p.68]

The parity claimed by Brezhnev did not exist. At the time of this address the Soviet Union had roughly 890 medium-range nuclear warheads deployed as compared to zero medium-range nuclear warheads for NATO. The preponderance of short range missiles also was heavily in favor of the Soviet Union, 1,618 warheads to 380 for NATO (see Appendix A). So a moratorium imposed at this time, prior to the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, would have given the Soviets an edge of 2,200 warheads.

The United States and NATO did not accept Brezhnev's February 1981 offer of a moratorium. Brezhnev then stepped up his efforts to increase the apprehension of Europeans by stating that the new missiles would create a dangerous unstable situation in Europe and also create an imbalance of nuclear forces:

The unchecked nuclear arms race in Europe is becoming lethally dangerous for all the European peoples. In order to somehow begin the practical solution of this problem, we propose, for a start, to at least freeze the existing state of affairs--that is, to stop the further deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles belonging to the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries in the European zone and the replacement of such missiles. It is alleged that the new Soviet proposal is aimed at consolidating the preponderance of forces that the Warsaw Treaty countries supposedly have at present. Needless to say, this is not so, I spoke about this in detail at the 26th CPSU Congress. Taking an overview of the nuclear potential the two sides have in the European region, one sees an approximate equilibrium of forces between the two sides. [Ref. 29: pp.148-149]

Two months later, Brezhnev shifted his propaganda from the military balance theme to a direct attack on U.S. arms control policy. During a dinner in honor of President Chadi Benjedid of Algeria, on 9 June, Brezhnev lambasted the United States and the Reagan administration.:

It is being alleged in Washington that the United States will shortly start or even has already started talks with the Soviet Union on questions of arms control. Unfortunately, these are mere words. I can say definitely: Not a single real step has been made on the part of the United States so far during all the time since the present administration came to power, either on that or other questions in order to continue, at least in a preliminary way, discussion of the essence of these questions. On the contrary, the Americans are delaying on various pretexts the beginning of such a discussion while we, for our part, are prepared for it any time. [Ref. 29: p.213]

In June 1981, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Social Democratic party of Germany, met with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow. During a dinner in Brandt's honor on 30 June, Brezhnev once again blamed the United States for holding up arms reductions as well as implying that the double track decision would destroy the spirit of detente:

...today there is a threat of a different kind: from detente to a new edition of the cold war. In the present situation, we should begin with limiting the nuclear arms race in Europe. We are ready to sit down at the negotiating table on this question tomorrow. But, because of the U.S. position, talks have still not begun. I can say that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to suspend the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country on the day that talks begin on the substance of the matter. The U.S. striving for military superiority over the Soviet Union undermines its stability in the international arena and makes its own security shaky. [Ref. 29: p.251]

On 25 July 1981, Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov expanded on Brezhnev's moratorium ploy, arguing as follows:

The proposal to establish a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by NATO countries and the U.S.S.R. is a major step of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union. It suspends the arms race; it brings in a ban on the deployment of both sides of new nuclear weapons and the replacement of existing ones by new ones. This in turn stabilizes the situation in Europe. The proposal for a moratorium is based on rough parity in medium-range nuclear weapons between NATO and the U.S.S.R. which has existed in Europe for a number of years, in which both sides have about 1,000 carriers. [Ref. 29: p.295]

Ustinov also claimed that the planned deployment of INF missiles would alter the nuclear balance by 50% in NATO's favor:

In the event of the deployment in Europe of approximately 600 more American medium-range nuclear missiles, NATO will obtain a superiority in carriers of over 50%. [Ref. 29: p.296]

This claim was utterly ridiculous. At the end of 1980 the Soviet Union had 200 SS-20 missiles deployed for a total of 600 warheads, or 28 more warheads than the entire planned deployment of 572 INF missiles. The disparity in numbers increased each year in favor of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 25: p.39]

Ustinov stated that the INF missiles would be used in a U.S. first strike against Soviet targets, not for their stated purpose as a second strike retaliatory force:

While declaring officially that the new missiles are allegedly meant for the defense of Western European countries, Washington in actual fact is intending them for the inflicting of "preventative strikes" on Soviet ICBM'S and other vitally important installations situated in the western areas of the U.S.S.R.. The main plan of the United States is an attempt to lessen the force of a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory in the event of aggression against the U.S.S.R. and is not concerned with the security of Europe. [Ref. 29: p.296]

On 24 September 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that formal negotiations on reductions of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe would begin in Geneva Switzerland, on 30 November 1981. Ambassador Paul Nitze would head the U.S. delegation and Ambassador Y.A. Kvitsinsky would represent the Soviet Union.

On 2 November 1981 Brezhnev took his propaganda campaign straight to the German people in an interview that was published in German in *Der Spiegel* magazine. In response to the question of how he viewed East-West relations, detente, and the world situation, Brezhnev responded with comments that reiterated the Soviet disinformation themes:

The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody, is not planning to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is of a defensive character. It rules out preventative wars and the first strike concept. I can also say with all responsibility that the Soviet Union will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against the states which have renounced their production and acquisition and do not have it on their territory.

If another almost 600 new American missiles are additionally deployed in Western Europe, NATO will receive a 50% advantage as regards carriers, and almost a 100% advantage as regards nuclear charges. Everything in the official explanations of the plans for the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe is false, from the beginning to the end. It is a falsehood that all this is additional armament in answer to the defiance of the Soviet Union, which allegedly, refused to hold talks on medium-range weapons. It is a falsehood that the United States decided to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe only in reply to the request of its allies and being motivated, exclusively, by the concern about their security. [Ref. 29: pp.525-531]

President Ronald Reagan stated his support for the 12 December 1979 "double track" decision, during an address to the National press Club, on 18 November 1981. This address discussed U.S.- Soviet relations particularly in the area of arms control. During this speech he made a proposal which became known as the "zero option":

The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be a historic step. [Ref. 30: p.17]

This address by Reagan, however, did not quiet the critics of his arms control policy and the "zero option" was not considered a serious proposal in Moscow.

President Brezhnev continued his appeal to the West Germans during a dinner in Bonn in his honor, hosted by Chancellor Schmidt, 23 November 1981. During Brezhnev's address he reiterated the same themes he voiced during the past year. However he did propose a new wrinkle, the offer of a unilateral reduction by the Soviet Union:

As an act of goodwill, we could unilaterally reduce a part of our medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 29: p.619]

This unilateral offer was not specific and was followed by the claim that the Soviet Union desired all nuclear weapons removed from Europe:

Generally speaking we stand for Europe becoming eventually free from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones. That would be genuine "zero option" which would be just for all the sides. [Ref. 29: p.619]

An example of the use of Western media for Soviet propaganda purposes is an article by Nikolai Portugalov, published in *NATO's Fifteen Nations* Oct-Nov 1981. Portugalov is a senior official of the International Information Department of the U.S.S.R.. The article discusses the nuclear balance in Europe and contains the same disinformation themes voiced by other Soviet officials:

Behind all talk about the desire to prevent the violation of the equilibrium is a screen for the United States drive to gain unilateral advantages in the strategic field to the detriment of Europe at the expense of its security, political stability, economic health, and particularly money. Approximate parity has been maintained between NATO and the U.S.S.R. in the field of medium-range nuclear missile systems in Europe for a number of years now - about 1,000 units on each side. [Ref. 31: pp.40-41]

D. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1982

Formal INF negotiations began on 30 November 1981 and were recessed on 16 March 1982. During this first round the U.S. presented a draft treaty, on 2 February 1982, which represented President Reagan's "zero option" proposal of 18 November 1981. The treaty called for the cancellation of the deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs and for the Soviet Union to dismantle all SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in Europe. The Soviet position consisted of a moratorium, by both sides, on the deployment of any new nuclear missiles for the duration of the talks, and also for equal reductions in systems. The reductions would be of medium-range systems in Europe, and in the waters adjacent to Europe, down to 600 by 1985, and down to 300 by 1990. Medium range was defined as systems with a combat radius range of 1000km, the agreement would expire in 1990.

Soviet President Brezhnev officially announced a moratorium on deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, during an address to the Congress of Soviet trade Unions, 16 March 1982:

We are freezing, in both the quantitative and qualitative respects: the armaments of this kind already stationed here, and are suspending the replacement of old missiles, known as the SS-4 and SS- 5, by newer SS-20 missiles. This moratorium will be in force either until an agreement is reached with the United States to reduce, on the basis of parity and equal security, the medium-range nuclear weapons designed for use in Europe, or until the time, if and when, the U.S. leaders, disregarding the security of nations, actually go over the practical preparations to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. [Ref. 32: p.119]

The intent of this announcement was to convey to the world the impression that the Soviet Union was inspired by peaceful motives. The Soviets would cease deployment of missiles while the U.S. and NATO were planning to install new missiles. The content of Brezhnev's address was given wide dissemination in the West, to the extent that President Reagan felt compelled to comment about it during a press conference three days later:

A unilateral freeze leaves them with 300 missiles and 900 warheads aimed at Western Europe - against nothing. But as I say, this is a pretty easy freeze you know, there were 250 of these missiles when we started to negotiate when I made my speech on November 18th. There are now 300. And its pretty easy to freeze when you're 300-0. [Ref. 32: p.121]

A freeze at this point would legitimize and perpetuate Soviet superiority in intermediate range missiles. A stop of the U.S. deployments would negate the NATO double track decision and cause dissension within the NATO alliance allowing the Soviet Union to continue on its path to hegemony over Europe.

The second round of the INF talks began on 2 May 1982 and ended 20 July 1982. During this phase the Soviets presented a draft treaty embodying their position as discussed in the first round. The session ended with no agreement or movement on either of the two proposed draft treaties.

During a news interview on 19 August, 1982, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov once again claimed that a balance of forces was the goal of the Soviet Union, not superiority:

U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in an interview to American journalists on August 9th, stated that all activities of the Pentagon are directed at attaining superiority over the U.S.S.R in a nuclear war and at concluding it on terms advantageous to the United States. He said that the nuclear capability of the U.S. should be superior to those of the Soviet Union at all stages of such a war. The Soviet Union rejects as a matter of principle the course of attaining military superiority. It does not aspire to it but neither does it recognize such a

right in the case of anybody else. Military balance on the lowest possible levels of armaments - such is the U.S.S.R.'s constructive approach to nuclear disarmament. [Ref. 32: p.532]

In November 1982, with the death of Leonid Brezhnev the leadership of the Soviet Union passed to Yuri Andropov. However, this leadership change did not slow down or alter the Soviet propaganda machine against NATO INF deployments. On 21 December 1982 Andropov addressed the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on nuclear arms reductions proposals. This address contained the same themes previously articulated by Brezhnev:

The war preparation of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have grown to an unheard record scale. Our position on this issue is clear! A nuclear war whether big or small, must not be allowed to break out. No task is more important today than to stop the instigators of another war. At present, that continent is beset by a new danger - the prospect of several hundred U.S. missiles being deployed in Western Europe. I have got to say bluntly: This would make peace still more fragile. [Ref. 32: p.921]

E. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1983

While Brezhnev had often commented that the balance of forces in Europe, including all nuclear forces such as U.S. "forward based systems", Andropov put new emphasis not on American forward basing but on British and French nuclear forces. He linked any intermediate range missile reduction to the reduction of British and French nuclear missiles:

We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept by Britain and France - and not a single one more. [Ref. 32: p.921]

This proposal was criticized by both American and NATO officials. During a press interview on 19 January 1983, NATO Secretary General Luns, commented:

The French and British nuclear weapons do not belong to NATO, they serve national purposes. [Ref. 33: p.21]

The Reagan administration rejected the Soviet proposal of including British and French nuclear systems in any negotiations.

The fourth round of INF talks began on 27 January 1983. The United States continued to push for the "zero option" draft treaty but indicated that flexibility was

possible. The Soviets modified their position slightly by proposing a reduction of SS-20 missiles to 162 missiles (providing no deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs), a level they equated to British and French nuclear forces.

On 30 March 1983, the day after the fourth round ended, President Reagan announced a new proposal in order to move the negotiations along:

When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than many. If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides. To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruises missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduces the number of its warheads on longer range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. [Ref. 33: p.229]

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko expounded on the Andropov line in a news conference on 2 April 1983. Gromyko took issue with Reagan's "interim proposal":

First, it does not take the British and French medium-range nuclear weapons, including 162 missiles, into account; second, it does not take many hundreds of American nuclear carrying aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers into account. As a whole, if NATO now has a 1 1/2 superiority in medium-range nuclear warheads in Europe, then in the event of the president's interim option, NATO would have almost 2 and 1/2 times as many such warheads as the Soviet Union has. [Ref. 33: p.263]

This claim of 2 1/2 times the warheads of the Soviet Union was not substantiated by Gromyko with any factual data or figures. As previously discussed even with the new INF deployment the Soviets would still have had an edge in numbers of missiles and warheads.

An often reiterated theme during the propaganda campaign was the alleged U.S. plan to limit nuclear war to Europe. On 6 April 1983, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, while trying to support that theme, reinforced NATO's idea of extended deterrence. He claimed that U.S. military doctrine called for limited nuclear war in Europe and commented that the Soviet Union would retaliate not only against Europe for any attack launched from Europe, but also against the United States. This comment was just what the Europeans wanted, extended nuclear deterrence, ensuring linkage between the U.S. and land based nuclear forces in Europe:

A particular threat to the cause of peace is embodied in the U.S. and NATO plan to deploy hundreds more American medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe. According to the pentagon's calculations, this will supposedly increase U.S. survivability in the event of conflict. In fact the United States is placing NATO allies under the threat of retaliatory nuclear strike and making them hostages to its nuclear strategy. For the majority of West European countries where American nuclear weapons are to be deployed, that retaliatory strike could be the last. Nor will the United States escape with impunity in that event. If Washington is calculating we will retaliate to the use of Pershings and cruise missiles only against targets in West Europe, it is profoundly deluded. Retribution will inevitably follow against the U.S. itself too. [Ref. 33: p.301]

Soviet General Secretary Andropov following his former predecessor's example, granted an interview to *Der Spiegel*, magazine on 24 April 1983. He used this opportunity to restate all the Soviet propaganda themes. The trend of the article was that the U.S. and NATO were increasing the risk of war by planning new missile deployments, while the Soviet Union truly desired arms reductions that would reduce the threat of war:

The purpose of the U.S. at the Geneva talks, as it has transpired, is to add at all cost new powerful armaments to the already existing vast nuclear arsenal of NATO. And it is only Soviet missiles that it wants to reduce. And as for the Geneva talks, it is known that the present U.S. administration has entered them with great reluctance. At the same time, when evaluating the prospects of our relations {U.S.S.R & FRG} we cannot, naturally, abstract ourselves from the plans of deploying new American nuclear missiles in the FRG. Judge for yourself what a damage would be inflicted to these relations if the territory of the FRG was turned into a bridgehead for delivering a nuclear strike at the U.S.S.R and its allies. Should this happen this would mean most grave consequences for the FRG itself. [Ref. 33: p.368]

The fifth round of talks commenced on 17 May 1983 and recessed on 14 July 1983. Following up on the interim proposal suggested by President Reagan on 30 March 1983, the United States proposed a global limit of 420 intermediate-range nuclear warheads on 16 June. The 'interim proposal' suggested a limit of anywhere between 50 and 450 warheads worldwide, if the Soviets agreed to reduce their number of SS-20 warheads to the same number of deployed U.S. INF. This session ended with no movement towards an agreement.

In an interview in *Pravda*, 27 August 1983, Andropov once again linked arms reductions to British and French nuclear forces:

...we declared our readiness to retain in Europe, after the reductions, as many medium-range missiles as the British and French possess. [Ref. 33: p.761]

The sixth round of INF talks commenced on 6 September 1983. During a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan, on 26 September 1983, made three proposals concerning the INF negotiations:

If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the U.S. for its part will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through U.S. deployments in Europe....The U.S. will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles....The U.S. will address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. [Ref. 33: p.702]

The most significant proposal, of the three mentioned, was Reagan's offer to discuss limits on aircraft. Previously Reagan did not want to include any limitations on aircraft in the INF negotiations, however, it was an attempt to show some flexibility to move the negotiations along. There was little positive response from Moscow concerning Reagan's speech.

In an interview in *Pravda*, Andropov proposed a new Soviet position on INF missile destruction instead of simple "removal" of missiles:

Today I can report our readiness to take one more big step. In the event of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, including the U.S. abandonment of the deployment of " " missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, in reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of British and French missiles, would liquidate all the missiles so reduced. [Ref. 33: p.762]

The significance of this proposal is twofold: it still makes U.S. cancellation of the INF deployments a precondition, and it shows no change or movement from earlier Soviet positions.

Andropov commented on the progress of INF talks in an interview on 27 October 1983. He proposed to reduce SS-20 missiles down to 140, and as usual, he blamed the United States for lack of progress:

As long as the United States adheres to its unrealistic, one-sided position, according to which the U.S.S.R is supposed to reduce its medium-range nuclear arms while the U.S. and its Atlantic treaty allies increase theirs, it is of course impossible to count on progress at the talks. [Ref. 33: p.911]

This would have been a reduction from the previous offer of 243 launchers to 140 launchers, which does not match Reagan's 30 March 1983 proposal of 420 warheads. Andropov also made reference to the Soviet moratorium on deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles:

I would remind people that 1 and 12 years ago the imposed a moratorium on the deployment of missiles in its European part. And, despite all the slanders, this moratorium is being unswervingly observed. [Ref. 33: p.912]

During the 1 and 12 year moratorium the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missile launchers increased from 300 to 351, with a concurrent increase from 900 to 1,053 warheads. [Ref. 25: p.39]

Andropov in his concluding answer, during the interview, threatened to cancel the existing talks if new missiles were deployed:

The appearance of new American missiles in West Europe will make it impossible to continue the talks now being held in Geneva. [Ref. 33: p.914]

On 14 November 1983, the first cruise missiles scheduled for NATO deployment arrived in England. Two days later, on 16 November, The Italian Chamber of Deputies endorsed the NATO deployment of new INF by a vote of 351-291-1. On 22 November, after a two day debate, the West German Parliament approved NATO's deployment of new INF missiles by a vote of 286-226-1. [Ref. 34: p.787] In response to these events, Yuri Andropov carried out his previous threat of ending the INF talks, on 23 November 1983:

The decisions taken the past few days by the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy show unequivocally that despite the will of their own peoples, despite the security interests of their countries and despite the interests of European and universal peace, those governments have given the green light to the deployment of U.S. missiles. The Soviet Union considers its further participation in those talks impossible. [Ref. 33: p.1008]

The NATO "double track" decision had survived five years of intense diplomatic pressure by the Soviet Union, with the alliance still behind the "double track decision" of 1979.

F. COVERT EFFORTS

Diplomatic efforts were one side of the Soviet attack against INF deployment. the other tactic was the use of covert or "active measures". These active measures included the use of agents of influence, local communist parties, international front organizations and false letters and forgeries.

The INF campaign was apparently orchestrated by the Central Committee's International Department. It is the principal organization responsible for the formulation, execution, oversight and monitoring of active measures worldwide. The International Information Department, a subset of the International Department, created in 1978, was the center of the entire propaganda effort against the West. A critical working unit within the International Department is the Committee for State Security, or KGB. Service 'A' of the KGB'S foreign intelligence directorate plans, coordinates and implements operations such as forgeries and other covert operations. [Ref. 35: pp.27-35]

One of the most important tools used by the Soviet Union in the INF campaign was manipulation of the "peace movement". The basic goal was to sharpen European memories of the destruction of World War II and transpose that fear into a movement against Western nuclear weapons. Over the years Soviet methods have become increasingly more sophisticated as they attempt to have people support Soviet policy unwittingly by convincing them that they are supporting something else:

Ever since the founding of NATO, it has been Moscow's publicly expressed intention to court the West European public by a variety of "peace offensives" directed at dismantling the Western defensive system or splitting the alliance. [Ref. 36: p.42]

The Soviets have a long history of exploiting peace movements. In their campaign against INF they used a vast variety of religious groups. They value church-affiliated movements because of the prestige and credibility that the presence of religion bestows on the movements. The KGB has established special centers in the U.S.S.R. to train agents for the specific mission of working with religious movements in Western Europe and elsewhere. [Ref. 14: p.13]

While not all peace movements are Soviet-controlled, it is largely through Soviet instigated direction and coordination that the peace movement adopts an anti-American orientation. Moscow exploits the existence of numerous groups in Western Europe that are initially attracted to the peace movement for widely different reasons.

Once they participate in the peace activities, they are captivated by the slogans and the emotional appeal. It is remarkable that they often protested against U.S. weapons even before they were deployed yet ignored the existence of Soviet weapons and denied that any military imbalance existed. This attitude helps to create pressure against Western governments to relax their defense efforts and make concessions to the Soviets in arms control, all in the quest for peace. The Soviet Union funnels financial support to organizations active in peace movements through a variety of channels. The CIA estimates that the activities of the World Peace Council, the Christian Peace Council, and eleven other international front organizations cost the Soviet Union about \$63 million per year. [Ref. 14: p.13]

The most important front organizations in the INF campaign were: the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC). The WPC was founded in 1949 and has over 137 affiliates around the world. Its headquarters is in Helsinki. The defacto leader of the WPC is Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a Deputy of the International Department, who is in charge of Soviet front operations. The WFTU was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in Prague. It claims 206 million members in 90 national organizations. The WFTU, in 1981, established the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament with the purpose of infiltrating non-communist trade unions. The CPC was founded in 1958 and is also located in Prague. It has affiliates in 80 countries. This front was very active in encouraging Western church groups to join the peace movement during the INF campaign. [Ref. 37: pp.22-24]

The West European peace movement sprang from its origins in the Netherlands. The idea was to Europeanize the movement. The success of the neutron bomb campaign led leaders of the "Stop the Neutron Bomb" movement to broaden its scope. At the February 1979 World Peace Council meeting in East Berlin, the slogan "Stop the Arms Race!" surfaced as the main demand in the struggle for peace. The target quickly became the NATO "double track" decision of 1979.

I. Peace Movement Operations in West Germany

West Germany was considered the prime target by the Soviet Union because it was the only state planning to accept U.S. deployments of Pershing II missiles. In November 1980, a meeting of various groups was held in Krefeld, West Germany. The theme of this meeting was that "nuclear death threatens us all no to nuclear missiles in Europe". This movement became known as the Krefeld Appeal and by June 1981 it

had reportedly amassed over one million signatures. The movement was conceived, financed, and controlled by German Communist party affiliated groups: the German Peace Union (DFU) which was a branch of the World Peace Council and the Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ). In June 1983, supposedly over four million Germans supported the "Krefeld Appeal". [Ref. 37: p.37]

A mass demonstration was held in Bonn on 10 October 1981. It was organized by the ASF and the AGDF, and both groups received large communist backing. Twenty six of the seventy organizations that participated in the demonstration were backed by the DKP. Six of the fifteen speakers at the rally were pro-Soviet. There were 300,000 people present at this demonstration. On 4 April 1982 a conference was held to plan the 10 June rally. Eight hundred representatives were present of which over two thirds were from DKP-sponsored groups. Four of the six members on the coordinating committee were from the DKP. The theme of the 10 June rally was "No to new missiles in Europe". It was timed to protest a NATO summit meeting and President Reagan's visit to West Germany. Over 300,000 attended the 10 June demonstration. [Ref. 37: p.39]

In 1982 the German Communist Party revived the Easter peace Marches. The German Peace Union (DFU) was the main organizer and its effort resulted in over 90 marches throughout the country, with over 500,000 participants.

The largest organization involved in the peace movement was the Greens. This was originally a group of environmentalists but were influenced in some cases by Communists. Petra Kelly, leader of the Greens, demanded the inclusion of U.S. forward based systems and the British and French nuclear forces in the Geneva arms talks, parroting the Soviet position. A rift developed between the Greens and the pro-Soviet organizations at the April planning conference for the 10 June demonstration. The Greens wanted to include opposition to the Soviet SS-20 missiles as well as American missiles; however, the pro-Soviet coalitions won out. Nevertheless the Communists did lose some influence in the Greens organization. [Ref. 38: p.17]

2. Peace Movement Operations in France

A large peace demonstration was held in Paris on 25 October 1981. It was organized by the Movement for Peace, a front organization of the French Communist Party (PCF), and by the communist dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT). The demonstration in Paris was not quite as one-sided as those in Germany as its slogan was : "Neither Pershing nor SS-20, but disarmament". This approach was not quite normal for the PCF:

Although it is generally pro-Moscow, the PCF has taken care to have a balanced approach in its official position on the issue of nuclear weapons. [Ref. 36: p.51]

3. Peace Movement Operations in Italy

A major peace demonstration took place in Rome on 24 October 1981 opposing the deployment of American cruise missiles. It was arranged by the Committee for Disarmament (an organization set up by the Italian Communist party (PCI)), Pax Christi, and the Catholic Left. The PCI however, often follows its own way as it favors a Europe independent of both superpowers. [Ref. 36: p.51]

4. Peace Movement Operations in Great Britain

The British peace movement was spearheaded by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. This group is not a traditional communist front, but, four of its twenty National Council members belong to the British Communist party. This is somewhat significant, in view of the small size of the British Communist party. The Greenham Common Women staged a long protest vigil against U.S. based nuclear forces in England. The British Labor party has adopted a platform to remove all American nuclear forces from England and with its movement to the left it has overshadowed the other movements. [Ref. 14: p.50]

5. Peace Movement Operations in Holland and Belgium

Within Holland the most influential group has been the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). It was founded in 1967, and gained notoriety in 1977 during the neutron bomb campaign. It has benefited from Soviet support but now has adopted a nonaligned posture. The IKV has been critical of Moscow's handling of Poland and has voiced a theme of Europe without superpower blocs.

In Belgium the most important organization is the Pax Christi, which has also recently declared itself as being nonaligned. The Belgian Communist Party (KPB) has been active in the peace movement. The 25 October 1981 demonstration was organized by the Flemish Action Committee against Nuclear Weapons (VAKA) and the National Committee for Peace and Development (CNPAD). Both these groups were created through KPB initiatives. In 1981 the KPB adopted the slogan: "Neither cruise missile, nor Pershing II, nor SS-20"; however, they usually adhere to the Soviet line. [Ref. 36: p.54]

6. Forgeries

KGB-sponsored forgeries were also a part of the effort against the deployment of INF missiles. On 22 April 1982, the Belgian leftist weekly, *De Nieuwe*, printed a

bogus letter dated 26 June 1979 from General Haig to NATO Secretary General Luns. It discussed potential first strike operations and advocated action to jolt those groups opposing INF deployments. The publication was timed to influence anti-nuclear demonstrations in the spring of 1982. [Ref. 39: p.1.]

The Soviets surfaced a doctored version of actual U.S. documents which had been passed to the KGB in the 1960's by Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson; between 1980 and 1981 versions of these documents appeared eleven times in Western Europe. [Ref. 39: p.16]

In November 1981, a Norwegian activist, Bjaine Eikeford, published an article claiming he had possession of U.S. war plans which called for nuclear bombing of Norwegian targets. [Ref. 39: p.16]

G. SUMMARY

The goal of the Soviet Union was to prevent the deployment of Pershing II nuclear missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy all accepted their assigned forces beginning in 1983. Therefore the Soviet INF campaign failed, at least with respect to its maximum objective. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group supported the "double track" decision throughout the propaganda campaign. NATO was not convinced by the Soviet rhetoric that the nuclear balance was even. Each and every communique issued by NATO, during this time frame, stated their concern of the imbalance in favor of the Soviets.

The Soviet propaganda campaign and their negotiations policy at Geneva were aimed at preventing the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM's in Europe. As negotiations were terminated on 23 November 1983, both sides had yielded little from their initial positions. The United States position at this time was basically the zero option proposal of 18 November 1981. The Soviets basic position had not changed: a moratorium on all new deployments of medium range systems. The Soviets still tied reductions to British and French nuclear forces, but had proposed to reduce the SS-20 missiles to 140. The Soviet walkout from the INF talks as well as the START negotiations was a final effort to sway public opinion against the deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs.

The Soviet walkout did nothing to stop the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs. What happened after the walkout is discussed in the next chapter.

IV. 1984-1987: THE SOVIETS RETURN TO INF NEGOTIATIONS

A. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1984

In April 1984, Konstantin U. Chernenko succeeded Yuri Andropov as the leader of the Soviet Union. This change in leadership, however, did not result in a shift in Soviet policy regarding the INF negotiations. Chernenko's position was that the United States must remove the newly deployed INF missiles before arms reduction talks could resume. The other prevalent theme in Chernenko's dialogue was the subject of prohibiting space weapons. In an interview in *Pravda*, on 2 September 1984, he commented on the purpose of potential arms talks:

What subject does the Soviet Union propose to discuss at the talks? The subject would be that of precluding the possibility of the spread of the arms race into outer space and fully renouncing strike space systems, including anti-satellite weapons. In other words, the aim would be to ensure that there is no threat to Earth of war from outer space, and no threat to outer space of war from Earth or from space itself. [Ref. 40: p.660]

During this interview, he once again blamed the breakdown in negotiations on the U.S. deployment of INF missiles. Chernenko did not, however, insist or mention the previous condition that the missiles must be removed prior to the start of any arms negotiations.

The friction between the Reagan administration and Moscow was eased somewhat with the 22 November 1984 announcement that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to enter into new arms reduction negotiations. Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would meet in Geneva Switzerland on 7-8 January 1985, to set the objectives and subjects of the negotiations.

Why, after a year of Soviet propaganda against any future talks, did the Soviets decide to shift positions? The Soviet propaganda of 1984 had not stopped the deployment of new INF missiles to Europe. Since not talking was not producing the desired results, it made sense to return to negotiations to attempt to halt the modernization of the West's posture. Also, Ronald Reagan had just been reelected for another four year term, and it appeared that Reagan was not about to unilaterally stop the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

The Kremlin, on the other hand, appears to realize that the tactic of boycotting the U.S. does not payoff. The Soviet obstructionism was intended to serve as a sort of shock therapy on West European and American opinion. Instead, it was widely viewed in the West as a nasty but cheap brand of blackmail. [Ref. 41: p.24]

B. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1985

The results of the 7-8 January 1985 meeting between Shultz and Gromyko were that new arms control negotiations would be resumed. They agreed to form three interconnected arms talks. One would focus on space, one on intermediate-range weapons in Europe, and one on strategic nuclear arms. The Soviets prime concern was still outer space, while the U.S. emphasized the INF and START phases of the negotiations. Gromyko stressed the importance of the space weapons section of the talks in his remarks after the meeting:

The conversation addressed acute problems concerning cessation of the arms race and the removal of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet side particularly stressed the importance of preventing the militarization of outer space. [Ref. 42: p.10]

On 12 March 1985, the first U.S. - Soviet arms talks in fifteen months opened in Geneva Switzerland. The United States team consisted of: Max M. Kampelman (Space and Defense Weapons), John G. Tower (Strategic Arms), and Maynard W. Glitman (INF). The Soviets were represented by: Yuli A. Kvitsinsky (Space and Defense Weapons who had previously been the chief negotiator in the 1981-1983 INF talks), Victor P. Karpov (Strategic Arms), and Alexsei Obukhov (INF - who had been deputy to Karpov during the 1982-1983 START talks). Glitman had been deputy to Nitze during the INF talks in 1981-1983.

On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was named as the successor to Chernenko. In his maiden speech as the Communist Party leader, Gorbachev said that Moscow favored a nuclear weapons freeze and a ban on all space weapons. Gorbachev, on 6 April during an interview in *Pravda*, announced a unilateral freeze on the deployment of SS-20 missiles until November [Ref. 43: p.15]. This freeze was viewed as nothing new and also as a propaganda stunt to stop the further deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The U.S. was not interested in a freeze but in the reduction of SS- 20s. Deputy press secretary Larry Speakes commented: "If they want a freeze fine, but that's not enough". [Ref. 44: p.3] A freeze at this time would result in

the Soviets having an advantage of 270 SS-20s in Europe, versus 54 Pershing IIs and 48 GLCMs. [Ref. 45: p.1]

The first round of the talks ended on 23 April 1985 with little progress achieved. These 'new' negotiations were spent reiterating previous positions. The Soviets were treating the talks as a package deal, while the Americans maintained that progress in one area should not be held hostage to the other areas.

As the second round of talks started on 30 May 1985, Gorbachev voiced a position often iterated during Andropov's reign:

We would not have a grain more than the French and British have, either in the number of missiles or warheads. [Ref. 46: p.9]

He also offered to scrap Europe based missiles if the U.S. abandoned the SDI program, adding that:

We have already suggested that both sides reduce strategic offensive arms by 1/4 by way of an opening move....We have no objections to making deeper mutual cuts....All this is possible if the arms race does not begin in space. [Ref. 47: p.1]

The second round ended 16 July 1985, with each side blaming the other for the lack of progress.

The third round of INF talks opened on 19 September 1985. Gorbachev, during a speech in Paris on 7 October 1985, announced that the Soviet Union was reducing its arsenal of SS-20s in Western Europe to 243, while proposing separate talks on European missiles with the French and the British. Gorbachev also proposed a freeze in Europe as well as Asia. [Ref. 48: p.1]

On 1 November 1985, President Reagan proposed that medium range missile forces be limited to 140 in Europe, and that the Soviets make a proportionate cut in Asia. The limit of 140 was chosen because that was the number of INF missiles expected to be in place by the end of 1985. The Soviets proposed a limit of 120 U.S. GLCMs and 243 SS-20s in Europe, and 144 SS-20s in Asia. This Soviet offer therefore would ban all Pershing IIs from Europe. This round ended with these proposals on the table on 7 November 1985. [Ref. 49: p.1]

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva Switzerland, 19-21 November 1985, for a summit conference. Little was achieved, but both signed a joint statement calling for a 50% cut in strategic weapons. This statement did not include a single mention of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and also called for early

progress on an interim INF agreement. This was thought to mean that the Soviets were accepting the U.S. position of separating out the INF agreement from the two other areas.

...Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. [Ref. 50: p.15]

C. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1986

Just before the fourth round of INF talks opened on 16 January 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a plan (on 15 January 1986) to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Part of this proposal called for the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. INF in Europe. This was the first time that the Soviets indicated a willingness to remove all their SS-20s from Europe. All previous proposals called for the elimination of all U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs, but with the Soviet Union retaining enough SS-20s to counter the French and British nuclear forces.

On 6 February 1986, during a three day visit to Moscow by Senator Edward Kennedy, Gorbachev announced that an INF accord was possible without a space arms connection. The only condition on the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet medium range missiles in Europe was for the French and British to pledge not to expand or modernize their nuclear arms and for the U.S. not to transfer nuclear weapons delivery systems to them. [Ref. 51: p.1]

Reagan responded to Gorbachev's January proposal on 24 February 1986, by offering in Geneva two options: the first was a phased reduction to 140 launchers on each side during the first year, a reduction to 70 on each side the second year, and to zero by the third year, with a proportionate cut in Asia. The second option was to make reductions in Europe first: followed by a 50% initial cutback in Asia. This proposal did not, of course, include any guarantee by the U.S. that France and Britain would not modernize their weapons nor did it include any U.S. guarantee not to transfer weapons to Britain or France. This offer was not viewed with enthusiasm in Moscow. The round adjourned 3 March 1986. [Ref. 52: p.3]

The fifth round of the INF negotiations commenced on 8 May 1986. The Soviets proposed a draft treaty that all intermediate-range nuclear missiles be eliminated from Europe. This proposal was a formal version of the offer made by

Gorbachev in January. This proposal called for the elimination of INF missiles in Europe over a period of five to seven years. This round ended on 26 June 1986.

The sixth round of arms control talks started 18 September 1986, with both sides making proposals. The Soviets proposed a ceiling of 100 INF warheads for each side in Europe, and offered token reductions in Asia. The U.S. counter offer was 100 warheads in Europe for each side, and 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S. permitted to match the Soviet allowance in Asia. These offers were on the table in Geneva when Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik for their second summit.

On 11 and 12 October 1986, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev conducted a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. While there were no final agreements reached on any arms reductions, the proposals that were later made public met with criticism from both the United States and European NATO officials. Reagan and Gorbachev very nearly reached an agreement on the 'zero option' proposal for INF missiles in Europe, and the agreement was prevented by Gorbachev's linking of restrictions on SDI to any INF reductions. Reagan refused to allow any linking of limits on SDI to any of the arms control reductions discussed, and no agreements were concluded.

At the summit Gorbachev proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet long range intermediate nuclear missile forces from European soil. The Soviet Union would be allowed to deploy 100 SS-20 warheads in Asia, while the U.S. would be allowed to deploy 100 warheads in the United States. Gorbachev also proposed a freeze on the deployment of shorter-range missile forces. Reagan agreed to this, with the proviso that the U.S. be allowed to match the Soviet number of shorter-range missiles. Reagan agreed to these proposals until Gorbachev indicated that an INF treaty would also require the United States to limit research on anti-missile defenses to the laboratory. Since 6 February 1986, Gorbachev had stated that an INF agreement would not be held hostage to any limitation on SDI; now with an agreement almost in hand, he reversed his position by once again linking INF to SDI.

The Soviets presented a proposal on 7 November 1986 in Geneva, based on Gorbachev's summit plan, that INF could not be separated from the entire arms package. The proposal still called for the elimination of all SS-20s from Europe, but did not mention any limits in Asia. This round closed on 13 November 1986. A special meeting was held 2-5 December in Geneva in order to advance the negotiations. The only agreement that was reached was that the talks were at a stalemate. [Ref. 53: p.1]

D. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1987

The seventh round of the INF talks started 17 January 1987 with a new Soviet chief negotiator. Yuli Voronstsov replaced Victor Karpov, supposedly to give the stalled negotiations new vigor. New life was breathed into the negotiations on 28 February 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev reversed his position on linkage between SDI and INF. He announced that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe could be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on INF could be concluded without delay. On 2 March, Voronstsov formally presented an offer echoing Gorbachev's February statement, and also suggested that the talks be extended three weeks. The Soviet offer was not a draft treaty, but was similar to the Reykjavik proposals without the linkage to SDI. [Ref. 54: p.1]

The U.S. delegation presented a forty page draft treaty on 4 March 1987. This proposal included procedures for on-site verification inspections, which the Soviets accepted in principle. On 12 March, the Americans presented a six point verification program. The U.S. provisions included:

1. a plan for on-site inspections to monitor facilities that produced, repaired or stored INF missiles.
2. a plan on whether the missiles would be dismantled, destroyed, or converted upon removal from Europe.
3. a plan to fix the specific locations of those missiles that each side would be allowed to retain on their soil.
4. a plan for data transmissions from missile tests would have to be uncoded, thereby allowing electronic monitoring of the tests by either side.
5. a plan for the exchange of detailed information on the missiles and its components.
6. a plan to keep the exchanged information current. [Ref. 55: p.4]

The round closed 26 March without a new Soviet draft treaty being presented. The Soviets did express some concern over the U.S. position that it reserved the right to convert Pershing IIs to Pershing I-A missiles in order to match the Soviet inventory of shorter-range (300-600 miles) in Europe.

During a meeting between George Shultz and Mikhail Gorbachev, in Moscow on 14 April 1987, the Soviet leader proposed a new plan for European missile reduction. Tass reported on 15 April that Gorbachev offered to eliminate all Soviet shorter-range missiles from Europe "within a relatively short and clearly defined time frame and also was prepared to eliminate battlefield tactical weapons". [Ref. 56: p.1]

General Vladimir Medvedev was named chairman of the Soviet INF negotiating team, as the eighth round of talks opened on 23 April 1987, and Alexsei Obukhov was given oversight duties. These appointments were viewed by the West as an indication that the Soviets were serious about nailing down an INF treaty. The Soviets presented a new draft treaty on 27 April. This draft agreed with the basic provisions of the U.S. 4 March draft as it called for the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe and for the prevention of basing any intermediate-range missiles within striking distance of each others territory. This provision would prevent the basing of INF forces in Alaska, an option favored by the United States. This draft also called for on-site verification inspections.

The U.S. team was surprised, however, when the Soviets issued a new demand: that the West German Pershing I-As must be eliminated for an agreement on shorter-range missiles. This demand was immediately rejected by the U.S. State Department. Spokesman Charles Redman commented:

The Soviets had not previously raised the question (of West German missiles) and for them to raise this issue now suggests a lack of serious intent.
[Ref. 57: p.1]

The U.S. and Soviet negotiating teams completed the first draft of a treaty, on medium-range missiles, on 1 June 1987. This combined draft was an attempt to unify the drafts presented by the two countries. Two points had yet to be resolved: conversion of Pershing IIs into Pershing I-As and the stationing of INF missiles in Alaska.

The U.S. team, on 16 June 1987, presented a new offer calling for the global elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF. This global zero option had previously been proposed by NATO's defense ministers on 15 May. NATO's foreign ministers met in Reykjavik 11-15 June and also endorsed the global zero option.

The INF talks appeared to be deadlocked through July, when Mikhail Gorbachev announced his acceptance of the global zero option. In an interview with the Indonesian newspaper, *Merdeka*, Gorbachev stated:

I can now tell you that in an effort to accommodate the Asian countries and take into account their concerns, the Soviet Union is prepared to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well, that it is prepared to remove the question of retaining those 100 warheads on medium-range missiles which are being discussed with Americans at the negotiations in Geneva, provided, of course, the United States does the same. Shorter-range missiles will

also be eliminated. In other words we will proceed from the concept of "global double zero". We do not link this initiative in this case with the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, on Diego Garcia. We would like to hope, though, that it, at least, will not grow. [Ref. 58: p.10]

The Soviet negotiation team formally presented the global double zero option proposal in Geneva on 23 July 1987. The Soviets also used a press conference to complain that the Pershing I-As are still an obstacle to a treaty. Other obstacles at this time were: the issue of converting Pershing IIs to Pershing I-As, the issue of the Soviets reducing their arsenal to match the U.S. arsenal prior to any U.S. removal of weapons, and the issue of equal rights to on-site inspections. The issue of conversion appeared to be settled on 28 July when the U.S. formally agreed in Geneva, that all missiles covered by a treaty would not be converted into Pershing I-As but would be destroyed.

The key stumbling block of the summer session was overcome on 26 August 1987, when West Germany announced it would dismantle the Pershing I-A missiles. Chancellor Kohl said that if the United States and the Soviet Union implement the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces, West Germany would scrap the Pershing I-A missiles. This announcement was hailed in both Moscow and Washington.

The U.S. announced a shift in its verification program on 25 August 1987. The new plan would limit on-site inspections to known missile facilities in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The previous plan had proposed inspections at a broad range of facilities. The new proposal did include provisions for monitoring by both sides the destruction of weapons, detailed data exchanges, and initial inspections to verify number of missiles.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived in Washington, D.C. on 13 September 1987 for talks with George Shultz. The main barrier to an agreement was the issue of Pershing I-A missiles in West Germany. The Soviets were not satisfied with Chancellor Kohl's pledge to dismantle the missiles, and wanted the issue covered by the treaty. The U.S. opposed including the Pershing I-A issue in the text of the treaty. A compromise was reached when the U.S. agreed to offer a written assurance to dismantle the Pershing I-As. This assurance would not be part of the treaty, but would probably be covered in a separate protocol attached to the treaty. They met from 15-17 September, and late on the 17th of September issued a joint statement declaring that they agreed in principle to an INF treaty:

The secretary and the foreign minister reviewed the full spectrum of questions regarding nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons arms control. In particular, the two ministers, together with their advisers, conducted intensive negotiations on the question of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This resulted in agreement in principle to conclude a treaty. The Geneva delegations of both sides have been instructed to work intensively to resolve remaining technical issues and promptly to complete a draft treaty text. [Ref. 59: p.1]

They also agreed to meet again in Moscow during the second half of October to review the text of the draft treaty, and to establish dates for a summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.

Shultz met with Gorbachev on 23 October 1987. Shultz was surprised when Gorbachev once again linked SDI to an INF treaty. The Soviet leader claimed that a summit would be possible only if the U.S. agreed to limit SDI testing. Shultz refused to agree to any ties between SDI and INF and left Moscow with no summit date in hand. Shultz commented during a press conference from Moscow:

Mr. Gorbachev, as it emerged, is apparently not yet satisfied, particularly in the area of space and defense, that the state of things is such that he is comfortable in visiting Washington, contrary to what was sent out when Mr. Shevardnadze visited Washington. [Ref. 60: p.4]

On 30 October 1987, Shevardnadze met with Ronald Reagan in Washington. After the meeting, President Reagan announced:

I have just finished meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and Mr. Shevardnadze, presented a letter to me from General Secretary Gorbachev: who has accepted my invitation to come to Washington for a summit on December 7. At that time we expect to sign an agreement eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF. [Ref. 61: p.5]

The specific details of the proposed INF treaty have not been published, but it is supposed to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles world wide, both LRINF and SRINF. This would result in the Soviet Union eliminating 441 SS-20 launchers, 112 SS-4 launchers, 77 SS-12/22 launchers, and 375 SS-23 launchers. The United States would eliminate 108 Pershing IIs, and 208 GLCMs. The U.S. would also ensure that 72 West German Pershing I-A missiles would be dismantled. [Ref. 62: p.22]

E. SUMMARY

The Soviet position regarding INF shifted repeatedly during the negotiations from 1985 to 1987. A summary of their proposals follows:

1. January 1985: Soviets offered to reduce SS-20s in Europe to 162, provided the U.S. removes all Pershing IIs and GLCMs.
2. November 1985: Soviets offered to limit SS-20s to 243 in Europe, if U.S. removes all Pershing-IIs and limits GLCMs to 100 warheads.
3. January 1986: Soviets proposed elimination of all SS- 20s, U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs, over a five year period, Soviets also dropped linkage to British and French forces.
4. February 1986: Soviets dropped linkage of INF to SDI.
5. September 1986: Soviets proposed ceiling of 100 warheads for each side in Europe.
6. October 1986: Soviets offered Reykjavik proposal of zero warheads in Europe, 100 warheads in Asia. Freeze deployment of shorter-range missiles in Europe, provided U.S. limit SDI research.
7. February 1987: Dropped SDI linkage to INF.
8. April 1987: Soviets proposed zero SRINF in Europe.
9. July 1987: Soviets proposed global zero on both INF and SRINF.
10. October 1987: Soviets linked INF treaty summit to limits on SDI, one week later reversed position.

An analysis of the Soviet negotiating positions during the negotiations reveals that the main objective was to remove the threat posed by U.S. Pershing-II and GLCM nuclear missiles, while maintaining the overall correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. Another objective was to achieve limitations on, or if possible, the cancellation of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. These two objectives supported the long time Soviet goal to reduce the military effectiveness of the NATO alliance. Chapter Five discusses how the proposed INF treaty serves Soviet goals.

V. IS AN INF TREATY A GOOD DEAL?

A. NATO'S VIEWPOINT

The United States and the Soviet Union signed an INF treaty on 8 December 1987. This treaty directly affects the nuclear force structure in Europe. Moreover, it directly affects the NATO alliance.

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group positively endorsed the proposed INF treaty during the recent meeting 3-4 November in Monterey, California. This endorsement may not truly reflect allied opinion regarding the treaty. On 12 December 1979, NATO declared that if the Soviets removed their SS-20 missiles, NATO would not deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The proposed INF treaty therefore supports the December 1979 decision. The question remains: does the elimination of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs serve NATO's security interests?

The consensus NATO opinion, after the Reykjavik summit when Reagan almost concluded an INF deal, was that the INF plan would fulfill a long term Soviet aim: the effective dismantling of NATO's strategy of flexible response based on the credible threat of the use of nuclear weapons. NATO'S existing reliance on nuclear weapons suits West European governments, as the forty year record of nuclear weapons in deterring Soviet aggression speaks eloquently for its effectiveness.

The deterrence requirement was in fact the main rationale for NATO's December 1979 decision on LRINF modernization and arms control. The decision satisfied three closely related deterrence needs: to replace obsolescent airborne delivery systems with reliable modern systems that could penetrate improved Soviet air defenses; to recouple U.S. nuclear guarantees in the presence of the intercontinental force ratios negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process; and to deploy U.S. land-based systems in Europe of roughly the same type as the SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union had begun to deploy in 1977. [Ref. 63: p.4]

To eliminate American medium-range missiles in Europe would leave NATO more vulnerable, a number of the allies contend, to hundreds of Soviet short-range missiles, to significant Soviet chemical weapons capabilities and to preponderant Soviet conventional forces. The possibility that American missiles might be removed has once again left many Europeans worrying about America's commitment to the defense of

Western Europe. Margaret Thatcher expressed her concern about the removal of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles as follows:

It is absolutely vital that we have strict verification arrangements and negotiations to correct the huge imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour of shorter range missiles. [Ref. 64: p.4a]

It is unlikely that NATO will compensate for the loss of the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs by increasing conventional forces. The cost in economic resources and the costs in political capital caused by the build-up of defense budgets make conventional compensation for lost INF too high. Lord Peter Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, commented on the costs shortly after the Reykjavik summit:

There is not enough money....Conventional forces are much more expensive than nuclear forces. Men are expensive and the cost of the sophisticated conventional weapons that we can now develop has increased out of all proportion to inflation. [Ref. 65: p.9]

Some Northern European countries are faced with a negative population growth which also contributes to the dilemma of conventional force maintenance. There are dwindling supplies of young men to man the armed forces.⁶ General Wolfgang Altenburg commented on the problem:

There are not enough men....Just to maintain the size of the German army would take every male born this year. [Ref. 65: p.9]

NATO'S European members naturally prefer a big U.S. defense budget to a bigger defense budget of their own. They also take great comfort in the knowledge that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend them. The truth is that most Western European governments do not want nuclear weapons to be written out of the scenario. U.S. nuclear weapons make low defense budgets a practical possibility. They do not want to make up the difference in the military balance by increasing their conventional forces. They would rather depend on the U.S. nuclear commitment. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe justifies the nuclear deterrent policy by arguing: "We don't want to make the world safe for conventional war". [Ref. 66: p.48]

⁶In 1987 West German recruits are expected to number 225,000, by 1994 it is expected to fall to only 140,000. Gary Thatcher & G. Moffett III, "Dilemma for NATO", *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1987.

The vocal criticism in NATO of the Reykjavik proposals subsided as it appeared that an INF deal was inevitable. The fact is that if the two superpowers decide to reach an agreement, there is little that NATO Europe can do to stop the arms control process. The reasons for the NATO acquiescence are political:

Their rationales include a judgement that the 1979 two-track decision has been vindicated, a reluctance to be seen as blocking movement in arms control, a concern that opposition parties (such as Labour and the SPD) might benefit from any recalcitrance, and a fear that explicit reservations about the zero option could undermine their credibility with public opinion and revive anti-nuclear protest movements. [Ref. 63: pp.5-6]

The linkage of American nuclear forces to the NATO alliance that was expected to follow the deployment of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs will be removed with this treaty, although other U.S. nuclear forces will remain.

B. THE UNITED STATES VIEWPOINT

Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 vowing that his arms control policy would be vastly different than his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. The Reagan administration's arms control policy was understood by expert observers to be based on the following principles:

1. There would be no agreements for the sake of agreement. Any agreement must be militarily meaningful and must promote stability and U.S. security.
2. In the past, the U.S. has based arms control limitations on the wrong things such as launchers, what should be limited is warheads.
3. The U.S. will avoid coupling force modernization programs with arms control.
4. Agreements must be based on strict verification which will not be restricted to NTM (National Technical Means). [Ref. 1: p.15]

Reagan also campaigned on a platform which declared that the U.S. must embark on a strategic modernization program. Reagan maintained that the U.S. must build-up the United States military forces in order to effectively deal with the Soviet Union. Reagan's position was that the Soviets would have no incentive to deal with an inferior opponent, and that the U.S. must bargain from a position of strength. These policies resulted in severe criticism from arms control advocates world wide. The criticism was that Reagan was not serious about arms control. Public debate on INF started in Europe in the smaller northern countries of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Internal opposition against nuclear weapons has grown into a major political force. What started out as a single issue political left wing campaign against

the neutron bomb and nuclear weapons has developed into a broadly based movement with considerable impact. A poll in Britain's *Guardian* newspaper showed that an average of 65% of those surveyed in Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany disapproved of European basing of U.S. missiles. [Ref. 67: p.35]

The nuclear freeze movement started in 1980 has had significant growth in this country, similar to the Greens in Europe. Congress has also passed restrictive legislation on arms control. This ground swell of anti-nuclear opinion increases the difficulties for the president to meet the requirements of a sound national security policy. The forthcoming treaty has quelled most of the criticism that Reagan is not serious about arms control.

Why does Reagan want an INF treaty, especially after the less than enthusiastic support from NATO on Reagan's proposals at Reykjavik? The Reagan camp is pleased because the proposed treaty is basically the same plan proposed by Reagan on 18 November 1981. Moreover, by remaining steadfast the U.S. has led the Soviets to concede on several key issues:

1. The Soviets returned to the bargaining table in 1985, when it was apparent that the deployment of new INF missiles was not going to be cancelled.
2. The Soviets dropped the demand to include British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations.
3. The Soviets conceded to count warheads vice launchers as the limiting factor in the negotiations.
4. The Soviets agreed to accept the global zero limitation on SS-20 missiles.
5. The Soviets dropped the linkage of SDI to an INF agreement.
6. The Soviets have accepted verification by on-site inspections.

The concessions listed above fulfill most of the principles of the Reagan administration's arms control policy. The most highly debated point is whether the treaty fulfills the principle of being militarily meaningful and whether it enhances U.S. security.

The strongest criticism of the proposed treaty is that the loss of the deterrent value of the INF missiles would make NATO vulnerable to massive amounts of Soviet conventional firepower. General B.W. Rogers voiced his criticism during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee:

The proposal to eliminate medium range nuclear missiles from Europe would leave NATO in as bad or worse shape than it was in 1979, when the allies first decided to deploy the weapons. NATO must, in my opinion, retain nuclear

weapons if its deterrent is to be credible. The level of risk to us in Western Europe would be substantial. [Ref. 68: p.3]

The security of Western Europe is undermined by the removal of the INF missiles because the Soviets would be able to compensate for their loss much more easily than NATO:

The SS-20s and SS-4s threatening Western Europe from the western Soviet Union would, in principle, be eliminated; but the United States would no longer retain any missiles on European soil capable of striking the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union would retain SRINF missiles and other systems (including sea-based and intercontinental forces) capable of attacking all the militarily significant targets in Western Europe from Warsaw Pact territory. Because of the elimination of a key part of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, it maybe argued, Western Europe would become more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation. [Ref. 63: p.4]

One can argue that the proposed treaty does not threaten the security of the United States since the weapons involved are located in Europe. However, one must consider that the U.S. has guaranteed to defend the NATO alliance with nuclear weapons if necessary. Therefore any treaty that reduces the U.S. inventory of nuclear weapons affects the credibility of the nuclear deterrence guarantee. A strong part of the rationale behind NATO's 12 December 1979 decision to deploy new INF missiles was to reassure NATO of the U.S. commitment to defend NATO against possible attack. Some argue that by removing the missiles as part of the INF treaty, the U.S. is furthering the Soviet goal to decouple the U.S. from NATO. This idea is debatable. The fact that the U.S. will still have over 300,000 troops stationed in Europe, if the missiles are removed, makes a strong statement of America's support for NATO. The Reagan administration has vociferously denied that the INF treaty reduces the American commitment to NATO, and also maintains that it also does not reduce the nuclear guarantee. The supporters of the proposed treaty point out that even with the removal of the Pershing II and GLCMs, the U.S. will still have over 4,000 nuclear warheads for theater use in Europe, so the nuclear commitment will still be there. However, if these systems are sufficient, why was the decision ever made to deploy new weapons? Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor criticized the treaty:

Their (INF) removal thus cannot but have a psychologically uncoupling effect completely contrary to the original purpose for their emplacement to reassure our allies. The administration erred in the first place by proposing the zero option in

1981; that decision should not now be used as justification for withdrawal of the weapons. The fundamental political purpose for the INF deployment remains. [Ref. 69: p.15]

The INF treaty will return NATO to where it was in INF force structure in 1979, but will not return the Soviet Union to its 1979 force structure. The treaty will presumably remove the SS-20s that were the prime concern of NATO in 1979, but it does not remove the other Soviet modernization efforts. The treaty does nothing about the improved air defenses developed by the Soviets which put at risk the ability of U.S. forward based systems to effectively strike the Soviet Union.

When comparing numbers, it appears that the Soviets are giving up more than the United States. However, by removing these missiles from Europe, the President limits the military options available to NATO. The void caused by the removal of the Pershing II and GLCMs could be filled by SLCM's. However, a SLCM fired from a U.S. battleship, off the coast of France, would probably be perceived, by the Soviets, as the same thing as an ICBM launched from Kansas, while it is not clear whether they would regard the firing of a Pershing II from West Germany in the same light. Despite the Soviet declaratory policy, it is a possibility that they would be reluctant to take the war to the shores of the U.S. because of a launch of a Pershing II in West Germany.

The removal of these missiles will lessen the military options of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposed treaty would require the Soviets to eliminate 1565 warheads, while the U.S. NATO would be required to eliminate 388 warheads (all the GLCMs have not yet been deployed) (see Appendix B). The Soviets are giving up much more than the United States; therefore, the treaty constitutes a major victory for Ronald Reagan!

C. THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT

Why would Gorbachev agree to a deal which includes such a large disparity in Soviet to U.S. reductions and why would Gorbachev concede on restrictions on SDI? The Soviet goals in the INF negotiations were to weaken the NATO alliance militarily and politically. The military objective was to achieve a force structure which supports Soviet military doctrine.

Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, the survival of the state has been a primary goal. Nuclear forces stationed in Europe which can target Soviet territory are a prime threat to the safety of the state. As mentioned previously U.S. forward based nuclear systems have been a Soviet concern since the 1950's and have been an issue as

far back as SALT I. An agreement that removes Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles therefore removes a threat to the Soviet state.

The range, mobility, and most importantly the short flight time of a Pershing II enroute to targets in the Soviet homeland, caused great concern in the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed that Pershing IIs deployed in West Germany could reach targets in Moscow. They also claimed that it was a first strike weapon, capable of surprise attack, with a range of 2500km.⁷ The Soviets feared the Pershing II more than the GLCMs. This was evident by their proposal in September 1986 to restrict NATO to 100 GLCM warheads providing NATO removed all the Pershing IIs.

The INF treaty not only removes a threat from the Soviet homeland, but also directly supports Soviet military doctrine. As discussed in Chapter Two, in the event of war, the Soviets would prefer to fight a conventional war rather than a nuclear war. The proposed treaty supports this in several ways. The deployment of INF missiles complicated Soviet targeting by tripling the number of time urgent targets. The removal of NATO's INF missiles reduces the critical target list from a potential 857 to 285. The Soviets have sufficient assets to cover these important targets. The proposed treaty not only reduces the target list but also reduces NATO's ability to carry out nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland. The reductions also reduce the alliance's ability to carry out theater nuclear war, therefore lessening the likelihood of a conventional conflict escalating into nuclear war.

From 1979 to 1987, the Soviet Union conducted a massive modernization of their theater nuclear forces (see Appendix-A and Appendix-B). They increased their short range forces by 62% and have over 9,000 warheads available for theater use. The reduction of 1,887 warheads is less than a 21% reduction in Soviet force levels. While it is rare for the Soviets to give up anything, a 21% reduction is a small price to pay, especially considering the conventional force balance between NATO and the Soviet Union. The short-range missile systems developed by the Soviets in the late 1970s are not only nuclear but can be used in a conventional mode. This dual capability increases the Soviet's ability to use these systems in a preemptive first strike against

⁷The Soviets claim a range of 2500km for the Pershing II vice the U.S. range estimate of 1800km. This is significant because at 1800km the Pershing II can not in fact reach Moscow from its deployment points in West Germany, but it could with a range of 2500km. *Whence the Threat to Peace*, 3rd edition, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1984, p.66.

NATO nuclear forces. Since the INF treaty covers only nuclear forces, these dual systems become much more important.

In sum, the Soviet Union is investing heavily in a new generation of short-range ballistic missiles based in Eastern Europe to participate fully in conventional preemption. To the extent that this force can contribute to the preemption goal, Soviet Planning confidence in executing the conventional-only contingency will grow. In fact, emerging missile improvements represent only the latest addition to the current cycle in the Soviet force development process. While frontal aviation's new weapon systems and technologies motivated the development of improved forms and methods of combat operations (conventional preemption by the air operation), highly accurate short-range missiles are influencing the perfection of these operational concepts. [Ref. 70: p.99]

Albert Wohlstetter criticized the proposed Soviet reductions as being insignificant due to their overall force structure:

The current effect to abolish intermediate-range ballistic missiles suffer from the "punched pillow effect", because the Soviets can simply compensate for their loss by bulging their nuclear arsenal in other areas, such as extending the range of shorter-range missiles. [Ref. 71: p.56]

It is still too early to tell whether Gorbachev has really conceded to Reagan's desire not to link SDI to the INF treaty, especially since Gorbachev has linked restrictions on SDI to INF, whenever he felt that Reagan might be a little too eager to conclude a treaty before he leaves office. Gorbachev has not given up on limiting SDI; he has only shifted it from INF to the START negotiations. After all, limiting space weapons has been a major part of Soviet diplomatic propaganda for over three years.

SDI was the major obstacle preventing an agreement at Reykjavik, and delinking it from the INF treaty appears to be a large concession to Ronald Reagan. The linking of SDI to an arms control agreement in Iceland achieved several Soviet goals:

1. It gave the world the impression that the U.S. was attempting to destroy the ABM treaty by pursuing the SDI program.
2. It attempted to show that Reagan, and not Gorbachev was holding up arms control negotiations by Reagan's unyielding position on SDI.

It appears that this was successful, especially in Europe, where a recent poll indicated that Europeans believed that Gorbachev was working harder than Reagan to achieve world peace. Congress' recent cut of the SDI budget may have been influenced by the Soviet propaganda campaign. It certainly allowed Gorbachev to back off the SDI issue thereby appearing more sincere and conciliatory in desiring the achievement of an arms control deal.

Many Western Sovietologists believe that Gorbachev needs an arms control deal to enable him to proceed with his economic programs. There has been a long standing study by U.S. intelligence agencies to determine the scope of Soviet defense spending in comparison to the growth of the Soviet economy. Estimates range from 8% to 20% of Soviet GNP goes to defense, depending on the source of the study. While the actual numbers vary, most intelligence experts believe that the Soviet economy is stagnating and that economic reform is necessary.

In the latest Soviet Five Year Plan 1986-1990, Gorbachev has stated his desires to dynamize the Soviet economy. His goals are to increase investment in the consumer sector by 50% (compared with 32% in the previous plan), and increase retail trade turnover by 33% (compared with 16% in the previous plan). It is unlikely that he will be unable to reach these goals if 20% of Soviet GNP continues to go towards defense. Therefore the military complex must yield to the consumer sector. [Ref. 72: p.26]

Since the SS-20 is a modular missile, support parts from SS-20s could be used to make SS-25s. The proposed treaty supposedly would prevent this type of conversion. However, it probably will not prevent the Soviets from doing some type of component switching. It is highly un-Soviet to throw any thing away!

D. CONCLUSION

Despite the apparent Soviet concessions to Reagan in the INF negotiations, the signing of the treaty would be a victory for Gorbachev. The treaty may accomplish both the military and political goals of the Soviet Union. The military goal of removing the threat of Pershing IIs and GLCMs would be achieved. The political goal of weakening the NATO alliance by decoupling the U.S. from its allies may also be furthered by the treaty.

The removal of NATO's INF missiles reduces the ability of NATO to exercise the nuclear option of flexible response. NATO's nuclear guarantee may be suspect due to the size of the arsenal of Soviet nuclear strategic weapons. A key decision to deploy new INF missiles was to visibly link the U.S. commitment to NATO's defense. The most important reason for the INF deployment was their deterrent value. This deterrent value will be lost with the INF deal.

The signing of an INF treaty also enhances the reputation of Gorbachev as a peacemaker. Gorbachev's manipulation of Western media has helped reestablish detente between the Soviet Union and the West. Through detente, the Soviet Union

will continue to get needed technology to further expand the Soviet economy. President Reagan has been called "the great communicator". However, many Europeans feel that Gorbachev is more sincere than Reagan in regards to arms control and disarmament. The INF negotiations have only increased this image of Gorbachev.

One can argue that the INF treaty is a mistake because it removes Pershings IIs and GLCMs which are a strong deterrent to the Soviets. However, one must remember that there are still over 4,000 nuclear warheads in Europe linking the American nuclear guarantee to NATO. Also, it is this author's opinion that the strongest deterrent to the Soviets is not nuclear weapons but the 300,000 American troops stationed in Europe. As long as these troops are deployed to Europe, the U.S. will be visibly linked to NATO. The treaty does remove the forces that NATO considered important, in 1979, for U.S.-NATO linkage. However, it is not necessarily an indication that the U.S. desires to delink itself from the alliance.

This treaty, if implemented, would be the first arms control treaty that actually reduces arms. This makes the treaty a significant achievement for the Reagan administration. However, one can argue that the treaty is also a significant accomplishment for the Soviet Union. Only time will tell if the air of detente created by this treaty, furthers world stability or furthers the march of communism!

APPENDIX A
INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1979

SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT

IRBM MRBM	#Deployed	First Deployed	RANGE(Mi)	WARHEADS
SS-4	500	1959	1,200	500
SS-5	90	1961	2,300	90
SS-20	100	1977	4,000	300

SRBM

SS-1B	440	1965	50	440
FROG-7	474	1965	45	474
SS-1C	554	1965	185	554
SS-12	100	1969	500	100
SS-21	50	1978	65	50

NATO

MRBM	0
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SRBM

HONEST JOHN	54	1953	25	54
PERSHING 1-A	180	1962	450	180
LANCE	98	1972	70	98

(figures compiled from The Military Balance 1978-1979)
 International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, 1979

APPENDIX B

INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1987

SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT

IRBM/MRBM #Deployed First Deployed RANGE(Mi) WARHEADS

SS-4	112	1959	1,200	112
SS-5	0	1961	2,300	0
SS-20	441	1977	4,000	1323

SRBM

SS-1B C	143	1965	50	143
FROG-7	214	1965	45	214
SS-12 22	77	1969	500	77
SS-21	350	1978	65	350
SS-23	375	1980	230	375

NATO

MRBM

Pershing II	108	1983	1125	108
GLCM	208	1983	1400	208

SRBM

PERSHING I-A	72	1962	450	72
LANCE	108	1972	70	108

(figures compiled from The Military Balance 1986-1987)
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